Praxis and History by Garnjobat, Gordon
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1987 
Praxis and History 
Gordon Garnjobat 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Sociology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Garnjobat, Gordon, "Praxis and History" (1987). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 
1539625427. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-08n3-sd06 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
PRAXIS AND HISTORY
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Gordon Garnjobst 
1987
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
_ _ _ ______________
Author
Approved, May 1987
-L_j
Gary A. Kreps
Satoshi Ito
Jon Kerner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......  . iv
LIST OF FIGURES.................    v
ABSTRACT....................  vi
CHAPTER I. LOGICAL PUZZLES   ... 2
CHAPTER II. HIERARCHY.................................   15
CHAPTER III. AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY AND NUCLEAR WAR... 38
CHAPTER IV. DOMINATION AND PERCEPTION................... 74
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................  . 86
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Marion 
Vanfossen, Terje Bye Fjeldheim, Gatsinzi Basananyenzi, 
Richard Quinney, David Peltier, Ken Funmaker, Jr. , Barbara 
St. Germaine, Holly Youngbear, Jim Miller, Bob Potempa, 
Clyde and Vern Bellecourt, Luis Garcia, Tom Bedonie, Bill 
Kays, Paul Barclay, Rolf Holts, Greg Nelsen, Maria Running 
Moccasins-Pearson, Winona LaDuke, Ron Maclay, Leo Begay-Neg, 
Dennis Banks, Lonnie and Maylene Gray, Donald Wanatee, Sr., 
Reuben Snake, George Barta, Robert Clinton, The Iowa City 
Big Mountain Support Group, the Eugene Havens Center for the 
Study of Social Structure and Social Change, and the All 
People’s Congress.
The writer is also pleased to have this opportunity to 
express thanks and appreciation to three very patient and 
perceptive sociologists. Gary Kreps, Jon Kerner and Satoshi 
Ito were unfailingly supportive, encouraging and responsive 
to this phantom student.
iv
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1 .      3
2 . 7
3 . - ..............................................................................  20
4 .  . .  69
5 .     73
v
ABSTRACT
This study is an explicit attempt to formulate a 
conception of social phenomena according to principles 
derived from Taoist philosophy, especially as set forth by
Robert Pirsig in his Zstn and the.  Art..__..jQ.f Motorcycle
Maintenance. The result is that the study was compelled to 
take an historical approach. Then we shall see how such a 
conception may be drawn upon in order to solve problems of 
policy legitimation. In Chapter One, we shall consider the 
possibility that a dominant interpretive scheme in social 
theory serves to obscure social reality. Dualistic thinking 
tends to . inform social theory with an array of logical 
puzzles that impede access to social reality. In Chapter 
Two, we shall examine how hierarchy is a form of dualism, 
and how this allows hierarchy to substitute for an 
historical conception of social phenomena. In Chapter 
Three, our goal of social reality is restored to the extent 
that we can grasp the reality of Domination, Following a 
preparatory look at domination in both everyday life, (the 
Black struggle for affirmative action), and the rise of 
Fascism in Germany, historical analysis shall be used to 
sensitize us to the relationship between American Indian 
History and nuclear war, using a critical theory of 
distorted communication and concealed domination. A
conclusion is put forth that the suppression of praxis in 
social theory is, in the final instance, determined by the 
suppression of American Indians in our society. This 
analysis will then be summarised and correlated with some 
properties of bourgeois visual perception, in Chapter Four.
vi
PRAXIS AND HISTORY
CHAPTER I 
LOGICAL PUZZLES
Shall we sit back and watch the social system crumble 
on the TV screen, or can we step out of our private views 
and interests, figure out what is good for humanity and act 
on it? Of what use is the sociological imagination to this 
legitimation crisis? Sociological interests derive from 
matters of ultimate concern, but this source is frequently 
lost sight of in debates that seem to oscillate between the 
poles of logical puzzles. And while this is going on, 
societal means increasingly take on a life of their own, 
becoming ends in themselves. Interpretive understanding is 
sundered into disjunctive, bi-polar categories, and the best 
we can do is take one category in our left hand, and one 
category in our right hand, and try to solve the puzzle of 
how they fit together.
The need in the modern world is for symbols, and 
theories, that give meaning to our experiences. At the same 
time, our very relation to our experience has been placed at 
stake by the development of the modern world. The late Alvin 
Gouldner was hopeful that ideology could serve as the symbol 
system we need. Indeed, he warned us that the attenuation of 
ideologies in the modern world constitutes not simply the
2
3undermines the legitimacy of the total social order of 
everyday life in the modern world (Gouldner, 1976 : 210).
In other words, we face a legitimation crisis (Habermas, 
1975). How can ideology guarantee the meaning of our 
experiences, our ability to believe, when the culminating 
triumph of its historical (bourgeois) development as a 
tunnelizing, problem-focused structure, is also the 
condition for the attenuation of all ideology 
(Gouldner,1976; Debord, 1983). Where do we turn for
rational justifications for policies when the very phrase 
"rational justification" places objective facts in our right 
hand, places relative values in our left hand, while we wait 
for some ultimate means-to-end consummation. So far, the 
only such consummation on the horizon is nuclear war.
Nowadays an everyday life must be lived under the 
shadow of a nuclear war, while our experience grows 
increasingly split between the personal and the socio- 
historical. It is this same split keeping facts and values 
apart. If facts and values could be represented
horizontally, we could then picture a disjunction between 
the personal and socio-historical vertically.
Figure 1.
Socio-historic Meaning
Subjective Values Objective Facts
Personal Experience
4Figure One reveals two very important points concerning 
the unfolding of this thesis. The horizontal line is the 
dimension on which dualism exists. It represents the decay 
of social theory into the polemic use of terms in debates 
about the methodology of social science (Levy, 1981 .* 111-
12). The vertical line is both the source of the horizontal 
line as H.e.11 5LS. that which the horizontal line excludes by 
setting itself up as the totality of what we can be aware of 
and accomplish. As a fettered form of the vertical line, 
dualism both reveals and conceals a compelling level of 
analysis.
The same dualism that keeps our left hand values and 
our right hand values spinning away from each other prevents 
us from engaging our sociological imagination. The 
sociological imagination is simultaneously an epistemology 
and an ontology. It is not a logical puzzle whose elements 
are held in each hand. It allowed Thorstein Veblen, for 
example, to see more deeply into social reality when, in
Absentee Ownership. he restored to awareness the
relationship between slavery and the phenomenal form of 
business in his day :
Perhaps also it was, in some part, in this early 
pursuit of gain in this moral penumbra, [slavery], that
American business enterprise learned how not to _l.e..t.
iJis._ .__rdght hand kno.w ..wh&t.. iis. _i..e.f..L Jiand. iiL .doing,
(Veblen, 1967 : 171).
Veblen saw that connections between elements of 
experience were not being made within a given form of social 
reality, and mode of social relations, because a more
elemental connection was not being made between that social 
structure and the slavery which preceded it. By analogy, we 
should follow Veblen's lead.
Social reality is more than exploitation and slavery. 
Since Veblen wrote, we have seen an extension of civil 
rights legislation, and finally a gratification-based 
consumer culture; and nuclear weapons that stand ready to 
destroy the way of life which they nominally defend. Yet we 
must admit that social reality is even more than this. It is 
a totality. The epistemological problem we face is as 
challenging as it is necessary, for nuclear weapons now
place the totality at stake in the modern world.
Accordingly, this thesis must be read as an attempt to 
address the epistemological challenge. Richard Slotkin (1985 
: 53) completes our image of social totality succinctly :
The fact of dispossessing Indians to make way for 
plantations and slavery had important consequences for 
the development of American ideology and myth.
Here is your vertical dimension in Figure 1
Sociology has a goal. This goal is usually referred to
as dialectics. Another word for this goal is praxis. This
goal is immersed in and permeated by a cultural complex of
dualities, themselves derived from our post-medieval
heritage. The resolution of fundamental ambiguities informs
every logical puzzle with an aura of alchemy. Much effort
goes into puzzling over something in our left hand and
something in our right hand. Just how do these two things
6“fit"? We are given over to a mode of thinking called
Rationalism, which is where we get the expectation for 
solving these dualistic logical puzzles. Rationalism is 
both the source of these logical puzzles and the answer to 
them. Rationalism promises too much.
Bourgeois thought inherited the ambiguous post-medieval 
heritage of Western Europe. The medieval synthesis of sacred 
Christianity and secular Roman Empire had, in this modern 
period, fallen apart. Rationalism emerged as a compensation 
for the historical withdrawal of transcendental reason with 
the waning of the middle ages. The world was becoming
estranged from its religious and metaphysical grounding. 
Becoming widespread was an inability to hold beliefs with 
the same kind of confidence attending the religious faith. 
Rationalism derives from this former religious cultural
context (E.A. Burtt, 1954). At the same time, rationalism 
is a distinctly modern outlook. But it is this post- 
medieval background that informs our logical puzzles.
The dominant logical puzzle in sociology today is 
probably the dialectic of action and order :
Every social theory inherently combines an answer 
to the question of action with an answer to the
question of how a plurality of such are interrelated 
and ordered... and this is precisely the task of 
critical theoretical thought (Alexander, 1982 : 90).
The intended meaning of this framework is that we 
derive from it standards by which to evaluate theory. The
7claim is made the the solution to a logical puzzle is found 
in the logical puzzle. Alexander promises too much.
Whatever else it may be, rationalism expresses the 
belief that logical puzzles have solutions. Logical puzzles 
can be visualised as a goal and the elements to be combined 
into the goal. The dialectic of action and order is 
presented in Figure 2.
Following Gregory Bateson’s (1979) lead, we can
represent logical puzzles generically. All this means, in 
reference to figure 2, is that you can fill in the circles 
with whatever concepts correspond to your own favorite 
logical puzzle.
Figure 2
Dialectic of \ 
Action and Order
OrderAction
Bateson would tell us the no matter how clever you are 
at specifying the linkages between the poles of your logical 
puzzle, they ultimately do not "add up" to the desired 
synthesis :
no amount of rigorous discourse of a given logical 
type can 'explain' phenomena of a higher type (Bateson, 
quoted in Berman (1984) : 230).
My argument shall be precisely that historical analysis 
requires attending to the "higher type" phenomena referred
8to by Bateson. What is needed is a source we can tap into, 
so to speak; the repository of subsidiary awareness which 
dualism tries to emulate but from which it merely derives; a 
reservoir of unstructured meaning and a model of ideology 
which can attend to it (Berman, 1984; Gouldner, 1976). This 
cultural resource may very well lie in our history (Barbu, 
1971).
Our problem is one of attending to this higher reality. 
As with the Tao, (the God-Head resides just as comfortably 
in a poorly-tuned machine as it does in a well-tuned one), 
so with dialectics. The dialectic continues to operate 
through all its fettered forms. But it is only from the 
vantage point of the higher reality that we can distinguish 
the difference. Bourgeois thought, on the other hand, 
reifies the fettered form, thereby degrading it and 
ultimately having to seek refuge in a metaphysical realm of 
ideals. Whatever historical reality presents itself from 
outside of this conceptual straightjacket is experienced by 
bourgeois thought in two major ways. In the first, are the 
forms of constituted un.r.e.a.£.on • Reason ends up confronting 
itself in a mystified form. In the second are the forms of 
nostalgia and romanticism that we see everyday as 
retrospect.
The main tenet of the sociology of knowledge is that 
our ideas and conceptions of social reality are grounded in 
the reality of our social existence. The potential of this 
approach has been fettered by a dominant interpretive scheme
9which tries to find a link between social structure and 
cultural meanings: another logical puzzle. As a
mystification of the potential from which it derives, the 
logical puzzle both conceals and reveals that potential 
(Kosik, 1976).
An interpretive method is based on the following two­
fold proposition : to identify the forces giving shape to
our form of life, you recognize the systematic exclusion of 
something essential that, in its very absence, continues to 
influence this deficient form of being: our condition of
estrangement. Then, by attending to it, you realize how 
what you attend to ultimately shapes the form of life. In 
the process, reality is expanded (Quinney, 1982) by being 
given a dimension of depth. In this dimension of depth is a 
vantage point that transcends the limitations on public 
discourse (distorted communication) and allows us to once 
again speak about rational justifications for policies in 
the human interest without being accused of relativism or 
relying on the continued oppression of outgroups remote from 
our everyday life. It was this dimension of depth which 
Thorstein Veblen tapped into, thereby expanding the self-' 
contained world of business enterprise in his day with its 
historical source. To abolish the conditions under which 
capitalist society experiences history in mystified ways is 
to actually incorporate history. This position, says Karel 
Kosik, is the only possible logical construction of social 
existence (Kosik, 1976: 85, 112-113).
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Our goal is a conception of the social which offers
more than a logical puzzle. We may be able to find this in
an historical approach -*
All points of view in politics, Mannheim argued, 
are but partial points of view because historical 
totality is always too comprehensive to be grasped by 
any one of the individual points of view which emerge
out of it (Mannheim, 1 9 3 6 :  1 5 1 ,  cited in Keller, 1 9 6 8 :
3 3 2 ) .
As each of the elements in a logical puzzle is only a 
partial aspect of the meaning from which they derive, it 
does not follow that the sum of those elements equals the 
meaning at the source. Only in the isolation produced by 
the imagination may these elements exist as dualisms in the 
first place. In the arena of policy legitimation, dualism 
presents us with distinctions in meaning between ideas that 
are related through the distinction : ideologies. Without a 
common source from which to derive, there would be no 
dimension to contain their divergence from each other. A 
mode of awareness which only sees the divergence does not
see how the elements may actually be related, except as a
logical puzzle. Consciousness is tricked into believing 
that only one or the other may be focused on at a time, 
thereby converting them into ideologies. In the process, 
their meaning is diminished, rendered relative to material 
interest, polarized from each other, and no longer 
compelling to believe in. It is this legitimation crisis 
which characterizes the modern model of bourgeois politics:
The one side affirms what the other denies, and 
vice versa ...That view and this view produce each 
other...That view involves both a right and a wrong and 
this view involves both a right and a wrong: are there 
two views or is there actually one? They have not 
found their point of correspondence, the pivot of the 
Way (Holbrook, 1 9 8 1  : 1 1 0 ) .
Many of us in sociology have derived our traditional 
interests from Emile Durkheim. According to Karl Mannheim 
( 1 9 8 2  : 2 0 8 - 2 0 9 ) ,  Durkheim was "on to something", and could
have distinguished it adequately had he not clung so closely
to the rationalist standard wJb.i.ch...Ansi^ t5.„s.o^ ljal _reallty__be.
apprehended in terms of a synthesis of logic and empiricism.
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Durkheim was in fact attending to higher level phenomena 
with his principle of association the way in which 
elements are combined in a relationship produces effects 
whose whole is greater than the sum of the parts. A 
rationalist logical puzzle undermined his goal. Durkheim 
conceded: less apparent facts are doubtless more essential,
but
at this stage of scientific knowledge they cannot 
be visualised save by substituting for reality some 
conception of the mind (Durkheim, 1982: 75).
Durkheim’s ambivalence about the ultimate reality of 
his “social facts" is perhaps well known by those familiar 
with his work. Are social facts "real things", or are they 
"like" real things. Or should we simply treat them "as if" 
they are. This hang-up from way back was where Durkheim was 
deriving his standards for evaluating theoretical 
development, and not. from an adequate conception of the 
social. Durkheim tended to a structural-functional ontology, 
and this "synthesis" breaks down into a logical puzzle 
itself. The ambiguous legacy we inherit from Durkheim is 
that while social facts are an e.JCtorrx.aJL., empirical order of 
reality not available to direct experience, the causes of 
social phenomena are ultimately Jjxt£_m al to society 
(Durkhe im, 1982).
To this we must add that Durkheim gave us a rather non- 
historical image of social phenomena. The effects of group 
association he attended to seem to occur after the groups
12
have come into existence. The actual genesis of these 
groups is not considered. This missing dimension is
ontologically significant because, without it, the question 
of the existence of important social classes remains 
unsettled, precisely because of the rationalist demand to 
apprehend them through a synthesis of logic and empiricism. 
Analysis breaks down into the fetishism of merely using 
concepts to designate a reality which conforms to the 
theorist’s position on the logical puzzle. Karl Marx did 
not have this problem when he set social classes in their 
historical context (Laclau, 1977).
The logical puzzle and the exclusion of historical 
context are related. A forced synthesis of structuralism 
and functionalism was Durkheim’s mystified way of 
representing a reality he recognized as essential, but which 
rationalism systematically excludes due to its close 
affinity with the bourgeois principle. If rationalism 
relies on the ability of logical thought to rid itself of 
collective representations and detect the essential, 
(Fuhrman,1984), logical puzzles reveal instead that we are 
not dealing at all with a rational expression of nonsense, 
but a "mystified expression of a rational reality" (Kosik, 
1976: 146-148).
Rationalist reason tends to be dualistic. A logical 
puzzle is the attempt by bourgeois thought to build a bridge 
over this division, "thus playing a trick on itself all the 
time, deceiving itself and hoping for unity" (J.
13
Krishnamurti, quoted in Butcher, 1986: 46). Instead of
achieving its goal, this faulty method must settle for a 
substitute which then, under scrutiny, breaks down again 
into the logical puzzle form, sending bourgeois thought back 
into the same state of ambivalence from which it derives.
In chapter two, we will focus on a process whereby 
Hierarchy reproduces the split between poles of logical 
puzzles onto a vertical dimension, thus maintaining dualism 
in the form of a disjunction between the personal and the 
socio-historical. Hierarchy exists as a representation of 
higher type phenomena, and as a substitute for it. This is 
because hierarchy encodes a dualistic organising principle 
onto a vertical dimension. Then, in chapter 3, we build on 
the previous chapter's defense of the sociology of 
knowledge. Problems of praxis are illustrated by examples 
from everyday life, (the Black struggle for affirmative 
action), and from Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of Fascism in 
Germany. Ultimately, though, we return to the theme of the 
depth of social reality as the meaning of social existence 
and the source of our sociological interests and 
experiences. Our attention will focus on the American Indian 
struggle against genocide at Big Mountain, in Arizona. We 
shall look for a possible link between American Indian 
History and nuclear war, using a critical theory of 
distorted communication and concealed domination. A 
conclusion shall be presented stating that the suppression 
of American praxis compels us, as sociologists of knowledge,
14
to come to terms with the suppression of the American 
Indian. I shall then draw upon this conception of social 
reality to advocate the necessity of legitimating American 
Indian treaty rights. The thesis will then close with a 
summarization in Chapter 4 correlating the analysis with 
some properties of bourgeois visual perception.
CHAPTER II 
HIERARCHY
Our goal is a conception of the social that offers more 
than a logical puzzle. Only in the nature of the social 
world in which we dwell will we find the standards by which 
to evaluate theories and policies. Our task in this chapter 
is to examine what we find in place of our goal. Social 
analysis systematically excludes social reality every time 
it insists on apprehending it in terms of a solution to a 
logical puzzle. In its place are substituted other concepts 
of reality-whether referring to structural, natural, or 
spatial phenomena. In the substitution, social reality 
becomes a subject of itself, and a deformation into a 
conditioned phenomenal form of life shrouded with ambiguity. 
Yet, in a sense, our estrangement from social reality is 
still within social reality. Social reality does not cease 
to exist when cast out by the mystifying standard which 
insists that the more of reality we can illuminate by a 
synthesis of logic and empiricism, the more 'real’ this 
reality will be regarded as (Kosik, 1976: 148). Although we 
are "taught to believe that an experience is more real if it 
is filtered through some machine or apparatus before it
15
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reaches our senses” (Slater, 1977 : 149), social reality
demands more of us than this:
Social existence is an area of being, or a sphere 
of existence, of which orthodox ontology, which 
recognizes only the absolute dualism between being and 
meaning, takes no account (Mannheim, 1936: 294).
We associate Karl Mannheim with a tradition that, in
recent times, has fallen into disrepute: the sociology of
knowledge. The main tenet of this tradition - that our
ideas and conceptions of social reality are grounded in the
reality of our social existence - derives from an abiding
concern this tradition has with reconciling rationality with
belief. Indeed, the post-medieval, modern world was born of
this fundament of ambiguity.
The problem I wish to address in relation to these
ultimate concerns is: how can we view dualism in social
context? If rationalism insists on apprehending social
reality through a necessary solution to a logical puzzle, it
is because rationalism derives from a larger world view
which insists reality be apprehended in terms of an absolute
distinction between the sacred and the secular. If the most
striking feature about the post-medieval, modern world is
its secularism, how are we post-moderns to understand
secularity when its culmination leaves no counterpart alive
with which to compare it? Now, for the first time, we are
truly in a position of having to give meaning to our
experiences all by ourselves:
17
The secularisation of the contemporary age has 
meant not so much the demise of the sacred as it has 
meant the infusion of the sacred into every realm 
(Quinney, 1982: 168).
My approach in this paper is to bid old Gods their 
destined farewell, while recognising that what we have in 
their place is our accumulated collective experience - our 
history. I shall draw upon two premises concerning the 
nature of social reality to begin this project:
1. Social reality is more than that to which we can
consciously attend in our everyday lives.
2. There exists in the world that which is
transcendent of everything in the world yet fully
present in everything in the world.
The essence of dualism lies in the capture of our 
attention by the 'circular' precept-percept perceptual 
circuit of the dominant bourgeois interpretive scheme. 
Distinctions in meaning between ideas that are actually 
related through the distinction, polarised from each other 
and relative to material interest, are actually splits in 
which each side of the split is contained in just such a 
vicious circle. As such, each partial value becomes absolute 
unto itself. Originally a value is derived from a higher 
order conception, part of which is made manifest and the 
remainder being latent (Stanley, 1968). Think of it as a 
figure emerging into view against a background. The 
stability of the perception is belied by its actual process 
whereby data is continually filtered into the foreground and
18
excluded into the background in such a way as to maintain 
the organisation. Once in place, the perceiver is likely to 
filter in only the information which provides positive 
feedback to the figure. A different type of information 
processing is required for a gestalt switch which would 
reorganize the whole into a new figure-ground configuration 
(Phillips, 1972 : 151). In a dichotomy, the polarized values 
themselves provide the points of reference for perceptual 
continuity. Now we have a new situation. The background that 
was present in the case of the perceived single value is now 
repressed, and twice removed from the situation at hand, so 
that its role in the process is entirely tacit. Each value 
is now the background for the other value. Each value 
excludes the other while each requires the other. Each alone 
is inconceivable - a .ding an sJLch - as Bateson (1979) puts 
it : a sound of one hand clapping. If each idea is clear and 
distinct, we must also accept that this clarity is 
associated with a repressive mechanism "[A] balanced 
adjustment, individual or collective, requires the presence 
in the field of perception of certain selecting, 
emphasizing, and eliMnatlllg for the purpose of
smoothing or avoiding tensions and conflicts (Barbu, 1960 : 
39-40) . "
Barbu maintains this response developed as an 
adjustment to the "high-strung” anxieties associated with 
the waning of the Middle Ages. The association of a narrowed 
focusing of the attention with heightened awareness can also
19
be seen as a way of dealing with moxal .aoibimity:. In the 
course of repression, Barbu maintains, we have lost an 
important connection to our history. In the separation, the 
world acquired depth in spatial terms for the first time, as 
a substitute for what was lost.
Ideology inherited the post medieval ambiguity. As an 
adjustment, however, distinctions in meaning between ideas 
that are related through the distinction are transformed 
into absolute fragments, the limitations of which are 
attributed to the interests of their adherents, who must use 
ideology to take what is partial and make it represent the 
general interest of the whole society. Thus is born the 
bourgeois principle.
Dualistic splits may well be symptomatic 
representations of a more basic disjunction between the 
personal and the socio-historical (Gouldner, 1976). The 
problem is with the bourgeois principle: you cannot extend a 
derivative to its source and expect to account for that 
source in terms of the derivative. This faulty method can 
only offer a substitute. In what follows, we shall consider 
Hierarchy as being this substitute.
Hierarchy is a vertical spatial metaphor that 
reproduces the split between poles of a logical puzzle onto 
a vertical dimension, in which our learned classification of 
'higher’ and ‘lower’ and the learned value that ‘higher’ is 
better than 'lower* is coded so as to preserve dualism 
(Schwartz, 1976).
20
Dualism as a logical type is carried over into 
hierarchy. Hierarchy begins with a logical puzzle, such as 
the demand to synthesize induction and deduction, and 
reproduces the split onto a vertical dimension. Hierarchy 
takes this: (each side of the split is a vicious circle).
Figure 3
and incorporates it like this-*
If you imagine Figure 3 being superimposed upon Figure 
1, the poles of the logical puzzle are on the horizontal 
line. When this state of being serves as an epistemology, 
our ability to give meaning to our experiences is impaired, 
thereby allowing the disjunction between the personal and 
social-historical to grow. How may we conceive of this 
epistemology?
21
Hierarchy emerges out of a process of intergroup bias 
which maintains group boundaries on a horizontal dimension 
of inclusion and exclusion. The ingroup-outgroup
distinction is our most basic social experience of binary 
contrast (Schwartz, 1976, 160). In what follows, we shall
examine findings that lend support to the idea that a 
categorical social relation is the elementary prototype for 
a dominant interpretive scheme.
Let us begin with our most basic form of social 
experience. We are, all of us, included in some groups and 
excluded from others. .Ingroups and outgroups provide for us 
our most basic form of social experience. To exist in a 
social category is to have a prototype by which our 
perceptual experience is organized. These schemata are like 
paradigms: data which 'fit’ the schemata are selectively
included while data which do not 'fit’ are filtered out. 
Categorization minimizes perceived differences among members 
within a group, and maximises them in reference to an 
outgroup. Similarities of outgroup members to ingroup 
members will be minimised. The category alone is necessary 
and sufficient for this to take place (Tajfel, et al. , 
1971). This is why we often hear racial comments about how 
people of a different race than ours all tend to look alike. 
The way we perceive is the way we relate.
This rudimentary fact also contains a moral 
classification. Outgroups will be discriminated against 
even when standards of fairness are supplied in experimental
22
situations. The salience of group identity is inversely 
related to the application of moral worth to outgroups 
(Tajfel, 1971). Thus any horizontal classification implies a 
hierarchical one as well:
When judgments concerning some quantifiable or 
rateable aspects of stimuli which fall into distinct 
categories are called for, differences in value or 
relevance cannot fail to influence the quantitative 
judgments in the direction of sharpening the 
objectively existing differences between the stimuli 
(Tajfel, 1981: 70).
Sense perception is a process of filtering, whereby 
"relevant stimuli are included and others excluded" (Mead, 
1982: 15). An organisation which distinguishes between
"figure" and "ground" is our most basic perceptual 
experience. This "selective perception" is precisely the 
definitive property of a dominant interpretive scheme:
Differentiation at the level of cognitive 
representations is always associated with evaluative 
and behavioral discriminations (Tajfel, 1981 : 60).
Social categorisation is not just an organising 
principle used in the absence of other guideposts; it 
is capable of creating deliberate discriminatory 
behavior (Tajfel et al., 1971: 163).
The group to which we belong shapes and distorts our 
perception of outgroup members in such a way as to be most 
conducive to keeping the distinction between the groups 
clear (Tajfel, 1981).
23
If a person desires stability in her or his social 
relations, information that is consistent with the 
person’s definition of the social situation should be 
useful because it reinforces and stabilizes one’s 
perception of the situation. Thus, in an intergroup 
setting a person should prefer information indicating 
that ingroup members are similar to oneself and that 
outgroup persons are dissimilar. This pattern of 
information preference is consistent with and serves to 
strengthen perceived differences between the ingroup 
and the outgroup (Wilder, 1981: 227).
Categorization minimises perceived differences and 
similarities between people when these perceptions would 
otherwise diverge from what would fit into the category. 
These same naturally occurring differences and similarities 
are maximised in the direction of their respective 
categorical stereotypes. This is why people tend to 
recognize individuals of their own race more easily than 
individuals of some other race, who all tend to look alike.
This elementary state of intergroup bias provides an 
organizing principle for social hierarchies as well. 
Evidence of perceptual distortion in terms of categories 
also works on a vertical ordering of perceptual distortions 
(Schwartz, 1981: 54). Since any ingroup members are more
variable in their perceived features than outgroup members, 
group evaluation is affected by virtue of being categorised 
into an ingroup or an outgroup (Me Arthur, 1982 : 161-5).
Tajfel and his associates report :
the curious finding that subjects often act to 
maximize the difference between groups rather than 
simply maximising benefits for the ingroup (Wilder, 
1981: 232).
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Categorization is a pervasive cognitive process 
(Wilder, 1981: 213), as well as perceptual (Schwarts, 1981, 
142). Hierarchy derives from the same code as horizontal 
group classifications, in which binary discrimination is the 
most primitive mental operation (Schwarts, 1981: 28, 54).
With this in mind, binary contrast can be seen as the most 
basic form of social experience. It is precisely through 
the binary mode that vertical categories align themselves 
with other types of dual classifications:
Disposing us as it does to binary categorisation, 
this cognitive operation [hierarchy] reinforces (if it 
does not actually derive from) the dualisms within 
society itself (Schwartz, 1981: 152).
The relation between classification and binary thought 
takes two dimensions: horizontal and vertical:
On the collective level, an availability of 
objective dual classifications not only reflects and 
sustains the boundaries of groups; it also leads to 
joint action toward that which is classified (Schwartz, 
1981: 156).
The findings I have summarized illustrate a 
relationship between binary social relations and binary 
ideas and values that is holistically mediated through 
perception, then perceived dualistically, after the fact. 
Perception is selective. Group boundaries are perceptual 
schemata that filter perceptual stimuli so that data which 
are included in the schemata are precisely the positive 
feedback which reproduce the schemata. Only in the bourgeois
25
imagination is this reality then regarded as more real than 
that which is filtered out or excluded.
Social reality is more than that to which we can 
consciously attend in our everyday lives. Bourgeois thought 
reduces this reality into its own terms, then extends 
itself back into that reality. Hierarchy is the result. 
Hierarchy represents a particular historical conciousness 
that comprehends nothing beyond itself. A self-contained 
world view needs an epistemology to reproduce itself as it 
excludes troublesome portions of reality. This (bourgeois) 
principle leads us to predict that in that very excluded 
reality lies the source of the exclusionary epistemic 
principle.
Bourgeois thought, however, could never appear 
legitimate on the basis of hierarchy alone. Certainly the 
bourgeoisie’s co-optation of natural science gives hierarchy 
a legitimately appearing guise in society, but still, the 
continuity With the old regime would have been too obvious 
for its class project to succeed. The triumph of the 
bourgeoisie was mediated by, and exalted by, ideologies. 
Ideologies made it possible for the bourgeoisie to extend 
itself into society in such a way that its class interest 
could be articulated on behalf of the interest of society as 
a whole. At the same time, those very same ideologies also 
prevented any understanding of human social existence as 
lived in the reality of the whole world, especially the 
continuity with the old regime. As a result, the bourgeois
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experience with ideology is a matter of premising certain 
achieved values in order to focus on precarious and scarce 
values. Paradoxically, this focus then undermines those 
achieved values premised as given (Gouldner, 1976).
Bourgeois ideologies are turmelizing, problem-focused 
structures. Thus they could exclude the old regime and 
replace it with a mystifying concept referring to the 
interest-tainted social location of the adherent of an 
ideology. This development presented Karl Marx with a real 
dilemma. How can we develop a sociology of knowledge, (in 
which we declare that our ideas and conceptions of social 
reality are grounded in the reality of our social 
existence), when bourgeois thought uses it (with seemingly 
equal force) in its own domination-concealing way? The 
sociology of knowledge has yet to emerge from this struggle 
whole.
Something was lost when the sociology of knowledge 
transplanted itself on American soil: its abiding concern
with the rationality of society’s goals rather than with 
merely the rationality of the means to achieve them. The 
limits such a context place on rationality have been spelled 
out by Gouldner (1976: 241):
All problem solving premises that some features of 
the situation are unchangeable. These features are 
defined as given. The 'givens’ limit and constrain 
foci of activity so that administrators focus the 
bureaucracy on the residual, non-given elements from 
which it selects its problematics.
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The means to ends relationship is pressed into serving 
as an epistemology which excludes attending to larger 
contexts. Social reality is more than that to which we can 
consciously attend in our everyday lives, but the dualistic 
nature of calculative thinking (Quinney, 1982) causes 
rationality to become a circular precept-percept perceptual 
circuit. The means thereby become ends in themselves. The 
"wheels of redundancy" keep turning endlessly. In a world 
rendered calculable, only so much is known as might be so 
rendered (Mannheim, 1982: 155). Then, without any goals,
there is no standard by which to measure anyone’s views 
(Schell, 1982: 151).
Emile Durkheim was on to something when he wrote:
the attention, in concentrating the mind upon a 
small number of objects, blinds it to a greater number 
of objects (Durkheim, 1953 : 21).
The excluded reality continues to exist even when we 
are not aware of it. Durkheim could have, at this point, 
gone on to reveal social existence had not his rationalist 
inclinations prevented him from doing so:
Everything is a product of certain causes. 
Phenomena must not be presented in closed series. 
Things have a 'circular’ character and analysis can be 
prolonged to infinity (Durkheim 1983: 67).
Instead Durkheim set up social reality as an external 
determinant:
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A false method again ends up making inadvertent 
substitutions that the scholar overlooks : he discusses 
‘reality’ whereas his false method has meanwhile 
transformed reality into something else and has reduced 
it to 'conditions’ (Kosik, 1976: 78,91).
These ‘conditions’ have had two serious and negative 
consequences for the sociology of knowledge. Just how these 
'conditions’ contain and ground subsequent developments 
becomes, for the sociology of knowledge, a logical puzzle: 
can we empirically establish a link between conditions and 
consciousness. A second and even more serious problem, is 
relativism. What happens when the rationality which 
discovers that ideas and conceptions of social reality are 
grounded in the reality of social existence sees itself in 
the same light? Karl Mannheim was aware that these two 
problems are related. Relativism as a doctrine premises 
Rationalism (Mannheim, 1936: 78-79).
The same narrowed concentration of the attention which 
excludes significant portions of reality also serves a 
dominant interpretive scheme which creates the logical 
puzzles that can only apprehend social reality in a 
mystified way. Dualism, the organizing principle of 
hierarchy, is also an epistemology that excludes from 
awareness that which hierarchy represents, or emulates. 
Bourgeois epistemology contains a fundamental dualism that 
is due to a dominant interpretive scheme, which uses our 
experience of social categories - ingroups and outgroups - 
in order to make it impossible to think historically.
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"Out of itself, the bourgeois [principle] undertook to 
produce the order it had negated outside itself (Adorno, 
cited in Levy, 1981 : 91)". The bourgeois principle contains 
an epistemological orientation with which it both reproduces 
itself and excludes the significant portions of reality to 
which my level of analysis aspires. Then, out of itself, it 
undertakes to emulate the excluded reality as it reproduces 
itself. It is this principle which seems to establish the 
disjunction between the personal and the sociohistorical, 
assuring that specific "troubles" do not get interpreted as 
the symptoms of the public "issues" generating them.
All I am saying is that hierarchy is a mystified 
substitute for a level of analysis we find ourselves 
estranged from. A hang-up from way back divides reality 
into separate realms of appearance and essence, and allows 
the scholar to deny ontological status to appearances while 
treating essence as the more real reality hidden behind the 
appearing one. Furthermore, the ultimate ‘proof1 of this 
method is based on observation - a most curious position if 
you think about it (E.A. Burtt, 1954). At best, a compromise 
position allows the scholar to regard hierarchy as a 
heuristic device (Wallace, 1983).
In the sociology of knowledge, this "two-world theory" 
(Quinney, 1982) treats "ideologies" as appearances and has 
varying conceptions for essence that all boil down to 
"conditions". In the separation, we are then led to expect 
that someday someone will be clever enough to specify the
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link between them. And, if not, then the theory violates 
this all important standard and is discredited. In the 
midst of all this, our "conditions" are being held to ground 
certain special effects or properties. In the separation, 
however, the scholar inadvertently ends up with a non- 
historical image of social relations in which association by 
itself is held to be the source of the special properties 
unique to social reality. The missing meaning is then 
expected to be revealed as a solution to a logical puzzle of 
'conditions' and consciousness - a mystification.
The dualistic organization of opposites which defy 
integration, the logical puzzle, is found in our most basic 
form of social experience; ingroup and outgroups. It is a 
faulty sociology of knowledge which addresses this issue by 
extending this dualism back into that reality to try to 
emulate it, but from which dualism merely derives, in the 
form of a logical puzzle. The logical puzzle reduces social 
reality to the conditions which ground ideas of social 
reality. Our ideas and conceptions are grounded in the 
reality of our social existence, but the potential 
realization is stillborn as soon as a logical puzzle insists 
that we demonstrate a link between conditions and ideas :
What we have done as it were, is to take a great 
pair of scissors and cut the single proposition out of 
the concrete situation in which it functioned and did 
its work, and then on this dislocated fragment we have 
constructed a fantastic and meaningless structure to 
build it back into the whole (Berman, 1984: 157).
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Whatever rationality is involved in tills approach is 
the rationality from which it derives but which the approach 
then abandons in the course of solving a logical puzzle. The 
existential determinants of thought are thereby reduced to 
the interest-ideology, or base-superstructure, logical 
puzzle. The jargon today is in terms of ’'premises'’ and 
"paradigms" (Gouldner, 1976 ; Perrow, 1979) but the
situation is the same. Instead of the rationality of the 
sociology of knowledge being grounded in social reality, it 
"grounds out" in the interest-tainted position of the
adherent of an ideology.
A mere shift in perspective, intended to reveal 
certain aspects of reality, actually forms a reality 
that is altogether different, or rather, substitutes 
one thing for another while being oblivious of this 
substitution (Kosik, 1976: 54).
The sociology of knowledge practiced as a logical 
puzzle derives from its abiding concerns with rationality. 
However, in this shift in perspective, there is not at all a 
successful emulation of that source, but only a substitute 
for it. We, the inheritors of this substitution, forget 
that you cannot emulate a reality with principles that 
merely derive from that reality. This rationalist alchemy, 
which conceals the reality it derives from, is itself 
responsible for the characteristic paradoxes of Western 
thought (Berman, 1984: 128). Addressing the cause of the
crisis, James W. Garrison (1986: 336) writes of:
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the surreptitious substitution of the 
mathematically substructed world of idealities for the 
only real world, the one that is actually given through 
perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable 
- our everyday life world...
The modern natural philosopher inherits this 
substitution. The result is that he has forgotten that 
the life world is the meaning fundament of natural 
science and his formulae are thereby usurped of their 
meaning.
The reality which, rationalism attempts to emulate, but 
from which it merely derives, remains fully in existence, 
and present in all that rationalism accomplishes. Martin 
Jay (1984 : 137) argues that pretending it is not is a
contributing factor to the "maintenance of the very 
hierarchical distinctions that [social reality] hopes to 
overcome”.
Dualism, the organizing principal of hierarchy, is also 
an epistemology which excludes from its dominant 
interpretive scheme that which hierarchy represents. 
Hierarchy can be understood as a continuation of dualism; as 
the attempt to get beyond dualism in terms of dualism. The 
essence of humanity is the unity of subjectivity and 
objectivity but,
The antinomy between ‘conditions' and 
consciousness is one of the different transitory 
historical forms of the subject-object dialectics which 
in turn is the basic factor of the dialectics of 
society (Kosik, 1976 : 70).
To abolish the conditions under which we apprehend the 
social through logical pussies is to actually incorporate
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the social. The nature of our subject matter contains 
within itself the critical significance by which to evaluate 
our field of study. If our goal is a unified conception of 
opposites, we must approach it from a level which lies 
beyond the sum total of dialectical pairs of opposites 
(Kosik, 120). Without this level, mental developments are 
mere substitutes for it.
For an adequate ideology, and epistemology, we need a 
complex of symbols, whose components adequately render the 
items of experience in a meaningful order. For knowledge In 
this known realm to hold, however, it must be integrated 
with a realm that is unknown, but whose reality must be 
accepted if the meanings established in the known realm are 
to hold (Levy, 1981 : 11). To do otherwise is to resort to
abstract sentiments (ideals) with which to cement together 
our polarised ideologies. This is the same model of 
bourgeois politics which is responsible for the very 
problems that it is changed with solving.
A system that cannot generate a humane existence 
without altering beyond recognition its basic mode of 
production, responds by attempting to integrate the 
problems of its own creation into the overall system 
(Quinney, 1980 : 64).
Jonathan Schell (1982 : 177) wrote, in The. Fate. of. the 
Earth, that we will not be able to make the world cohere 
horizontally until we first integrate it vertically. By 
vertically, Schell means historically. Hierarchy, by virtue
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of its vertical dual coding, is able to substitute for the 
historical depth of reality that is the fundament of meaning 
from which our institutionalized values are derived and made 
concrete. Its terms of resolution are an attempt to emulate 
something they merely derive from. Social ontology is 
informed by a structure of meaning, from which focused, 
polarized ideologies are derived (hence, also informed by). 
In the polarisation, however, tills relation is lost, and 
polarized ideologies merely bounce off each other, 
ironically taking from their opposites some of their own 
inner qualities, even as they reduce to relativistic, 
interest-bound perspectives. Our concrete experiences 
acquire meaning only when referred to the higher order 
conceptions from which they derive (Quinney, 1982 : 95).
As a collective representation, hierarchy both reveals 
and conceals a fettered dialectical analysis :
Hierarchy is... not a chain of superimposed 
commands or even the ranking of different values, but 
rather an expression of a holistic unity of opposites 
that is as much a part of the structure of human 
thought as the binary oppositions posited by Levi- 
Strauss (Jay, 1984 141).
With historical analysis, and in the following chapter, 
we have an opportunity to contribute to a project advocated 
by the sociologist Richard Quinney (1982 : 72-75) :
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A vastly different way of thinking about the 
sacred and the secular is to conceive of two qualities 
of existence, with the awe-filled character of the 
sacred informing the everyday secular pursuits of life. 
It is this this conception, as opposed to the [binary] 
notion, that I shall draw upon...The sacred-secular 
distiction prevents us from understanding our human 
existence as lived in the reality of the whole world.
In this dialectic of the sacred and the secular, 
Quinney finds the depth of reality.
Social reality does not just revolve around the
subjects and objects of our logical pussies. It does not 
just passively illuminate them. It is not subordinate to
them in any way.  ^ It has created them. They are subordinate
to it. The very existence of the logical pussle itself is 
derived from social reality (Pirsig, 1974 : 215).
The method of rationalism is to apprehend social
reality through a synthesis of experience and reason. The 
theory of rationalism promises that the world’s logical 
puzzles have solutions. Rationalism can’t be both, and in 
these terms, as we have seen, it promises too much. Our 
efforts are undermined by what should become known as the 
bourgeois principle : you cannot extend a derivative in such 
a way that it subsumes its source. This attempt is 
responsible for the post-medieval ambivalence we continue to 
experience in bourgeois society. The same dominant
interpretive scheme which splits subjectivity and 
objectivity is found in the disjunction between the personal 
and the sociohistorical. Hierarchy is the attempt to 
emulate integration at this level in terms of polarised
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relativism (in the policy arena, where all this applies, 
ultimately). In these terms, it is a substitute for a 
higher reality. In going beyond dualism, we recognise that 
the transcendent (historical) is not beyond the realm of 
existing facts, but :
as long as consciousness is captive of this split, 
it will not behold its historical character (Kosik, 
1976 : 125).
Logical puzzles are actually decayed and fragmented 
remnants of pre-modern, or medieval, cultural values. 
Logical puzzles are the conceptual categories, the medieval 
spectacles, through which we look, and think. The main 
epistemological effect of these medieval spectacles is to 
prevent us from seeing our very real continuity with the 
European Middle Ages. The ironic thing about these medieval 
spectacles, or logical puzzles, is that to move beyond the 
Middle Ages, we must first perceive clearly that we are 
still in the Middle Ages. Perhaps if we begin to view the 
logical puzzle as the hang-up from way back that it actually 
is , we can begin to abolish it. To abolish the conditions 
under which we apprehend history in mystified ways is to 
actually incorporate history (Kosik, 1976 : 125). It is my 
thesis that as we begin to recover our sense of history, we 
shall abolish the conditions under which we apprehend the 
social through the solving of logical puzzles. Instead, we 
can begin to view the world as standing always within the 
encompassing presence of all that is (Barrett, 1979 : 166).
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Concerning the following chapter, it will also be immensely 
helpful to keep this dictum in mind : the reality to which 
we attend is never only what it Is., but also what it w_a.s.. 
It is a system which has depth (Barbu, 1960 : 9).
The logical and empirical poles of the rationalist 
logical puzzle, when abolished, do not add up to anything, 
but instead will collapse into each other, in a most curious 
sort of way, like a black hole in space (Jones, 1982). Out 
of this metaphorical black hole emerge the phenomena in our 
everyday life that are of final consequence. A 
sancrosanctness that Marx (1971 : 41) called a universal
"ether" of being, John O'Neill (1974) calls it the 
collective focus of seeing and being seen that is the 
natural light of man:
Then, as out of a mist, there emerge the material 
and dynamic aspects of the earth, revealing themselves 
as powers in their own right, and no longer wearing the 
masks of the parents. They are thus not a substitute 
but a reality that corresponds to a higher level of 
consciousness (C.G. Jung, 1964 :36-7),
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M m i Q M  i m i m  history and nuclear war
Domination ; its effects are mediated by a social 
category in such a manner as to conceal domination from 
ordinary methods of interpretation. Domination has a 
dominant interpretive scheme whose effects are to conceal 
domination. Our ability to detect such realms is conditioned
by those very realms. In societies prising egalitarian
values, it is important to conceal domination (Gouldner, 
1976 : 205). This is accomplished by a process of distorted 
communication, which makes use of social categories :
Categorization deflects discourse away from the 
content of a dispute, (i.e., what the powerful are 
doing), to whether the subjects making the truth claims
are like everybody else (Sennett, 1980 : 182).
Domination takes advantage of the epistemological 
properties of social categories and thereby stays hidden 
from perception :
If there are important systems in the world that 
are complex without being hierarchical, they may to a 
considerable extent escape our observation and our 
understanding (H. Simon, quoted in Wallace, 1983 :
169) .
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A dominant interpretive scheme binds our attention to 
the dualistic thought form, thereby preventing us from 
adequately conceptualizing the disjunction between the every 
day life and the socio-historical. Nowadays the everyday 
life is lived in, immersed in, and permeated by the nuclear 
world. All our experiences have reference to, and derive 
from, this world (Schell, 1984 : 69). Our common response
is to dissociate ourselves from this reality and retreat 
into our private lives. In our minds, we choose this 
dissociation (Aronson, 1983 269). This is how we
experience the disjunction between the personal and the 
socio-historical. Our ability to do this is precisely the 
same mental operation put into play when social categories 
engage the perceptual process of binary contrast in order to 
produce dualistic thought. It is in this mental
"compartment“, dissociated from everyday conscious 
awareness, where domination exists. The matter is at once 
ontological and epistemological. Domination conceals itself 
in such a way that is directly useful to domination.
[T]he complex politics of cultural and social life 
is concealed beneath a "harmonious display of essences" 
or embedded in "bundles of meaning" too densely knotted 
for simple skepticism to unravel (Slotkin, 1985 : 24).
The bourgeois principle, a social category, and
distorted communication: these are the elements with which
domination produces de-historicized ideas and conceptions of
social reality. The social reality hidden behind this
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scheme is precisely the social reality producing it. 
Domination transcends social categories. It is a system 
which has depth.
Non-interfering, receptive, Taoistic perception is 
necessary for the perception of certain kinds of 
truth...The intrinsic validity of enlarging the 
consciousness involves realizing that the knowledge 
revealed was there all the time, ready to be perceived. 
(Maslow, 1976 : 80-81).
A theorist’s meta-framework and choice of substantive 
interest do not develop independently of each other. If we 
can state compelling reasons for our substantive choices, we 
will have a model of analysis with applicability in the 
public policy arena. The thesis of this paper is that the 
true test of a theory is not its position on a logical 
puzzle, but rather, its ability to uncover . The
presence of logical puzzles in bourgeois theory, and the 
presence of polarised relativism in bourgeois politics, 
indicates that we are dealing with a form of concealed 
domination. The veil that hides the social is as old as 
political philosophy (Frankfurt Institute, 1972: 17).
Domination is a mode of social relationship whose .mal 
effect on our ideas and conceptions of social reality is 
veiled by polarisation and relativism in our political 
culture. In this context of domination, our ideas and 
conceptions are .a_ub.st..it.U.t.e.a. In social science, the major 
form domination takes is the logical puzzle. The main 
effect of the logical puzzle is precisely to impede the
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necessary theoretical development our situation demands 
(Wexler, 1983 : 62-4). In the arena of public policy:
Legitimation crises are... not the result of 
deficits of meaning, but expressions of perceptible 
polarizations and the inability of ordinary methods of 
cultural defenses to contain them (Wexler, 1983 : 80)
The aim of critical theory is to discover the social
reality hidden by the ideological concepts of conventional
logical puzzles (Wexler, 1983: 88). This essentially
historical dimension of social existence is screened out of
bourgeois awareness by a process of distorted communication,
which makes use of common social categories in order to de-
historicize domination’s particular social relation and
re-present that relation as a social category. In this
context of domination, distorted communication reduces
policy legitimation to a matter of not discriminating
against anyone. According to the bourgeois principle,
discrimination is an inherently more liberal and humanizing
way of human relations than is domination. Hence its status
in today’s society as the. standard to use in resolving
problems in human relations.
As discourse goes , so go attention and awareness. How
may we attend to what we cannot yet speak about (Quinney,
1982 : 13). Today our post-medieval form of life depends on
the manimlation of human beings, the most liberal
attainment which the bourgeois principle is capable of.
Policy legitimation is largely a matter of avoiding
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discrimination. Evidence of legitimacy is dependent upon a 
standard of living attended by a steady supply of consumer 
gratifications. False consciousness is a belief about the 
source of those gratifications that is wrong. During a 
legitimation crisis, however, the bourgeois principle has 
nothing to fall back upon. Subject to de-legitimation by 
the attendant scarcity of gratification endemic to the 
periodic fluctuations in the circuits of capital, this 
situation can only be explained by having to provide a 
social theory that would also delegitimate the bourgeois 
principle by exposing the exploitation and domination upon 
which the consumer society feeds (Gouldner, 1976).
The bourgeois principle emerged out of an historical 
struggle against domination. Ideology - the power of ideas- 
was its light and its hope. But the very ideologies in 
print that gave legitimacy to the * limited bourgeois 
revolution in 1789 were printed on material manufactured out 
of surplus cloth, itself manufactured by textile mills with 
cotton picked by slaves in America (Gouldner, 1976). 
However :
The initial period of expansion had been 
characterized by the acquisition of land through 
warfare against the Indians (Slotkin, 1985 : 227).
It is no mere accident of history that the material 
preconditions for our liberation were achieved in the west 
at the very time nuclear weapons were developed (Aronson,
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1983 : 286). If the "unthinkable" happens - a likely
possibility within the next 25 years, according to E. F. 
Thompson - the event will be entirely internal to bourgeois 
society. In the dominant interpretive scheme, bourgeois 
'realism’ has reference to the bourgeois perceptual world, 
which is organized into means and ends (Mead, 1982). 
Bourgeois analysis predetermines the range of its results by 
excluding from analysis of politics and society any decisive 
concepts which might threaten to illuminate its dark side 
(Aronson, 1983 : 264). In the exclusion, the means have lost 
their object, their goal. The means become ends in 
themselves in an "ever-more-progressive substitution of 
technical solutions for political ones" - precisely in order 
to conceal prevailing social and political tensions. For t 
his reason it is no accident that our society should 
generate a tendency toward the "self-destruction of its 
subject as a defining trait of its most recent stage" (see 
Aronson, 1983 279-81). In this analysis, concealed
domination is the key to understanding nuclear war.
All modern development is enmeshed in a process of 
domination, as well as something yet more explosive. "We are 
living in the very midst of social dynamics which promote 
the urge to turn to genocidal solutions for unsolvable 
problems" (Aronson, 1983 : 192-200). Yet such a political
logic forces us outside the realm of the usual perceptible 
determinisms within the bourgeois world view. The matter is
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at once epistemological and ontological (Aronson, 1983: 
255). The usual bourgeois semiotic refers to a world that 
does exist. At the same time, everyday life is lived in the 
fog of denial, and retreat into privatism (Aronson, 1983: 
259-69). And the public sphere is frozen into an
uncontrollable, "accumulating logic of process" (Aronson, 
1983: 274).
Seldom are such matters made the subject of public 
debate. Public discourse today does not have the ability to 
step outside the limits of the sum total of the viewpoints 
that make it up. Public discourse is plagued by a multitude 
of crises and ambiguities that go beyond a human being’s 
capacity to integrate and attend to holistically. I
recently watched a televised public forum where American 
Black spokesmen discussed their deep concern for domination 
in South Africa, while ten minutes later expressing optimism 
that American economic growth offers some hope for Black 
Americans to make some gains under the Reagan
administration.
A further example is provided by the problem our
society faces in trying to legitimate the policy of 
affirmative action. An outgrowth of previous civil rights 
legislation, affirmative action does not have the legitimacy 
of civil rights legislation because it attends to a form of 
life - a mode of social relations - excluded by a dominant 
interpretive scheme which addresses social reality
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exclusively in terms of discrimination. In addressing the 
fact that slavery, (domination), still oppresses Blacks 
today, affirmative action is placed in the c.m itxadl.ct.o.ry 
position of having to satisfy liberal demands for non­
discrimination across social categories. Affirmative action 
is de-legitimated by the charge of “reverse discrimination". 
In the context of these ingroup versus outgroup dynamics, 
distorted communication makes use of social categories to 
try to extend a principle of justice into a form of life and 
mode of social relations from which the principle of justice 
merely derives ■ It is the bourgeois principle again which 
applies the dominant interpretive scheme in its faulty 
attempt to subsume the legacy of slavery with a principle 
addressed to, and grounded in, a mode of association that 
has historically derived from slavery, i.e., discrimination.
To continue with the example: some time ago, when I
lived in Iowa City, a conflict erupted in the local school 
system and was reported in the local newspaper, the Iowa 
City (March 13, 1985). The school board and
an association of Black parents whose children attend school 
in Iowa City were the antagonists. The month was February, 
and “Ground Hog Month" was in competition with "Black 
History Month” for the official cultural policy in the 
school system. The Black parents came into conflict with 
the school board when the latter would not publicly endorse 
Black History Month after it had already committed itself to
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its traditional policy by investing in Ground Hog Month. By 
the time of a scheduled school board meeting, the issue was 
so charged that the school board was accused of “racism". 
One board member left the meeting in tears, protesting that 
she had two adopted black children in her family.
Ultimately, the board’s final decision came down to their
not being sure of the curriculum changes the new policy
would require. They needed time to study the matter.
Something was going on in this local milieu, and we 
should try to identify the public issue it represents
(Mills, 1959). Does Ground Hog Month "mean" anything, or is 
it just a cultural ornament? The suppression of Black 
History Month as a policy, in favor of the cautious advice 
of liberal bureaucrats on the school board, was defined as a 
curricular issue requiring further study. After all, 
discrimination is no longer supposed to be an issue in our 
post-civil rights era.
But Ground Hog Month may have some hidden meaning in 
its own right. In an age of manipulation, symbols are like 
advertising: innocuous fictions nobody believes in, but they 
"work" selling products and helping things run along 
smoothly. Likewise, from the school board’s point of view, 
the symbolism of Black History Month was to be interpreted 
as a subjective package in which to wrap a curricular 
product, for which arguments on behalf of by Black parents 
could be rendered relative and superfluous, with simple
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compromise being held sufficient to achieve the type of 
consensus that would go into the school board's final 
decision in the next round of debate. Anything beyond this 
could be, and was, dismissed by the school board as 
"ideological".
According to Habermas (1975 : 112-13), compromises in
these polarised situations are only pseudo-compromises that 
disguise the actual domination extant in the political 
arena. In this essentially domination-concealing discourse,
Ground Hog Month is a way of assuming a stable. backgroimd
scheme that is taken to be achieved and non-problematic 
(Gouldner 1976). Its unobtrusive symbolism, (slightly 
steeped in manipulation), is actually a tacit claim that all 
is well within this particular institution. Its reality is 
political, not emotive, as we are conditioned to believe. 
Black History Month challenges the tacit legitimation 
conveyed by Ground Hog Month. The symbolism of Black 
History Month is a form of life speaking to us - a window 
opening to the past - and not a window-dressing draped over 
a curricular product. Yet those were the limits placed on 
it and the terms in which it was to be judged and 
interpreted. The problem is that Black History Month was 
deprived of its critical significance, its slavery 
uncovering function, by the politics involved in 
interpreting symbols. If you are oppressed, on top of being 
discriminated against, you are forced into the contradictory
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position of having to represent this fact with a mode of 
discourse capable of rendering only a de-historicised 
version of what you are trying to say. The dominant 
structure which oppresses you is concealed by a mode of 
discourse that only signifies a social relationship that is 
merely a derivative of where you are coming from (Coward and 
Ellis, 1977). In this case, discrimination is a remote 
derivative from slavery (domination). Consequently, your 
struggle for justice appears as superfluous ideology, and 
you are effectively de-politicized, subject to the charge of 
relativism.
The ideological role of Ground Hog Month in the Iowa 
City school system was to represent an important 
institutional premise; that of a stable background scheme. 
The role of this premise was to substitute itself in the 
place of the historical reality that Blacks were demanding 
be publicly recognised, thereby excluding it from attention 
and awareness. The premise itself became the arena of 
debate, thereby setting the limits on what would be 
acceptable discourse.
Even with history repressed in the background, twice 
removed from the situation, the institutional premise 
conveyed by Ground Hog Month still serves as a mystified 
reminder of the level of awareness demanded by the 
situation. As a mystification, the premise reveals and 
conceals a compelling repository of "subsidiary awareness"
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(Gouldner, 1976 : 204) that is the "space" which domination 
uses, but did not create. The "space" itself is a creation 
of history alone, to which the Blacks were claiming to be 
the rightful heirs. Thus, domination can be understood as 
being in competetive struggle for this "space" with the very 
social reality of which it is merely a form. Estrangement 
from this level of awareness was experienced as polarization 
and relativism at the level of policy legitimation. 
Attention became bound to the elements of the split, and was 
unable to transcend the ideological contradiction; unable to 
supply the missing meaning to this local legitimation 
crisis.
As a methodological guideline, any historically given, 
concrete, general mode of social relations with which we 
deal must be actively related to previous formations from 
which the given mode derives, but only in the sense that an 
antecedent state does not determine a subsequent one. The 
relation between them is exclusively chronological 
(Durkheim, 1982). In a sense, each formation is a version of 
what it derives from, but even more inportantly, each 
formation is also a version of that which its predecessor 
has derived from. The internal principles operating in a 
previous mode continue to operate through the new mode. 
Each formation is never only what it is, but also what it 
was. It is a system which has depth. Ernesto Laclau makes 
this key point in his "Fascism and Ideology". Laclau was
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writing about exploitation and class struggle, informing the 
rise of fascism in Germany with a Marxist perspective. 
Laclau tells us that while the bourgeois principle attends 
only to the liberalizing passage from exploitation to a more 
general and stable form of di.acr.iJ»lna.t.i.o.n attending 
bourgeois class antagonisms, inequality is still a product 
of domination :
the struggle between classes only becomes 
intelligible if the over all political and ideological 
relations of Domination characterizing a determinate 
social formation are brought to bear.
Laclau goes on to ask:
What is the relation between these two kinds of 
antagonism? What is the relation between the
ideologies in which both kinds of antagonism are 
expressed? (Laclau, 1977: 104-5).
When conditions allow, the general attainment of 
exploitation does not stabilise into a more general 
(liberal) relation of discrimination, characteristic of 
bourgeois state democracy. Industrialisation and capital 
accumulation in pre-Nazi Germany, with widespread feudalism 
still intact among the Prussian Junkers, revealed in Fascism 
not how class antagonisms led to Domination, but rather, how 
they derive from it. With Fascism, those who were least 
aware of their economic exploitation became the prime target 
of Nazi hegemony : the lower middle class. The isolation of 
this class from the working class movement caused an 
insurmountable split between capital and labor, making it 
impossible for them to share state power. Capital
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accumulation and state power could then only be combined in 
a social formation of domination.
In Laclau’s analysis, this development was possible due 
to an ideological crisis in the working class of the German 
society. In Marxist analysis, exploitation, the struggle 
between classes, is historically in between domination, 
(feudalism and slavery), and bourgeois state democracy. In 
the case of Fascism, exploitation failed to open out in the 
more liberal direction. Instead, something far less liberal 
appeared instead of democracy. The previous mode, closer in 
time to feudalism, from which the given mode of class 
antagonism (exploitation) derived, re-formed itself when the 
given mode was unable to reform itself according to the more 
liberal relations inherent in bourgeois class antagonisms 
(discrimination). Fascism (domination) facilitated a
revolutionary sweeping away of pre-bourgeois feudal economic 
forces without a corresponding democratization. The hardest 
hit in the ensuing economic disaster was precisely the lower 
middle class, the very class closest in time to those pre- 
bourgeois feudal forces being swept away by this 
"revolution”. It was this very class, which supported the 
National Socialist (Fascist) party the most, whose social 
position was most conducive for the domination to form :
The primary problem was not that the German lower 
middle class turned to Nazism in droves but that it 
existed in the first place as a particularly regressive 
social constellation... (Aronson, 1983 : 58-9).
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Aronson goes on to cite Barrington Moore, Jr.:
[T]heir values are those of early competitive 
capitalism, they are petty bourgeois rather than 
bourgeois... with a strong overlay of both bureaucratic 
and even .feudal features" (Aronson, p. 51. Emphasis 
added).
History revealed what the bourgeois principle 
concealed. Fascism revealed. noi how the lower middle class 
was led into domination, but actually how it derived from 
this type of formation which it subsequently helped shape. 
Fascism was able to dehistorise this, its particular social 
relation, by re-presenting the lower middle class as a 
social category. This is probably where the category of Jew 
enters in. Discrimination against Jews was significant not 
only for what it did to Jews, but for what it did to
undermine the relevance of the working class to the new 
formation. The working class was isolated from the new 
formation. Isolation of labor from capital served to
dramatically increase the visibility of the relationship 
between labor’s ideology and its social location. Unable to 
articulate an ideology free from the distortions of its
social location, this crisis came into sharp relief with the 
structural isolation of the working class. The working 
class was depoliticized when its long-standing disputes fell 
by the wayside and its interests reduced to a matter of who 
was and who was not a Jew.
The category of Jew, then, the lower middle
class’ social location as much as it revealed the social
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location of the working class. A mystified expression of a 
real reality, it also engaged a dominant interpretive scheme 
which prevented anything compelling from being said about 
it.
Domination is the creation of a dominant interpretive 
scheme which mystifies social reality in a way that is 
directly useful to domination. It ensures that social 
analysis will be deprived of its object while at the same 
time it provides social analysis with substitutes for this 
goal. It is my belief that we can apply this interpretive 
method best if we let it run its full course. It is capable 
of discovering the reality which fetters analysis, thus 
discovering its own object, much like the Zen approach which 
aspires to the level of awareness in which the eye which 
sees becomes able to see itself. In our society, this 
objective reality is to be found in American Indian History.
We do not "see" American Indian history. It is our 
"blind spot". Thus, it has the property of a sociological 
"black hole". Our collective dissociation from this reality 
is what our history is all about. It is in the past. 
Indians today are merely one more social category along with 
other minorities.
It was no accident of history that only after the anti- 
discrimination, civil rights reforms of the 1960’s did the 
American Indian Movement become as visible as it did 
(Burnette and Koster, 1975). After years of force-feeding
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American culture to Indians while systematically denying it 
to Blacks, the Black struggle was then represented as a 
legal problem amenable to legislative action. In
actuality, it is the Indians who have had the legal problem 
of stolen land (Deloria, 1969). The American Indian
Movement revealed not how anti-discrimination reforms 
eventually extended to Indian-White relations, but rather 
how civil rights is only a derivative from that fundamental 
social relationship.
Today Indians exist as a category. The American Indian 
has a special status in our society, but as a category that 
status is concealed. A sociology of knowledge which is 
capable of fully understanding the relationship between 
ideas and conceptions of social reality and the reality of 
social existence should begin with the American Indian. How 
may we attend to this phenomenon, (and I can’t stress this 
enough), in which an actual social relation produced its 
own social category?
In fact, the tragic climax of formal fighting 
between the United States and the Indians - the 
slaughter of Big Foot’s band of Minneconjou Sioux at 
Wounded Knee, South Dakota - did not mark the end of 
the Indian struggle to preserve national identity. 
Although virtually unnoticed, the fighting continued 
into the twentieth century as surely as it had during 
the previous century of contact. The spectacular 
aspect of war bonnets, clashing cavalry swords, and the 
flaming frontier was simply missing, and without those 
dramatic and traditional symbols of Indian warfare, 
people thought ' that the Indians had been tamed 
(Deloria, 1974 :4).
From first contact to final dispossession, the American 
Indians have always protested the degradation, injustice, 
and cruelty they suffered under European domination. A form 
of life speaking to us, we have not listened, no doubt due 
to our insistence on comprehending them through the 
distorting category of "Indian” - a category which still 
exists to this day, unexamined but very much in need of 
theoretical attention (Berkhofer, 1978). Social science has 
not been very responsive to this challenge. Termination, a 
particularly odious policy imposed upon several tribes in 
the 1950’s, for example, devastated the economic basis of 
the sovereign Menominee nation of Wisconsin. In 1953, the 
same year as the passage of the termination resolution, 
legislation was passed in Congress giving certain states 
jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Generally known as 
Public Law 280, it was an explicit attempt to extend a 
principle of justice, i.e. "self-determination", all the 
better to facilitate the real intention of Termination. The 
rational justifications put forth in behalf of P.L. 280 were 
all carefully couched in discursive terms referring to 
"discrimination" :
The best example of... legislation during the 
termination era is "Public Law 280", passed in 1953, in 
which Congress took the unprecedented step of passing 
^neral legislation &xi.£!ld.in.g state jurisdiction into 
Indian country...
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The Termination Act provided that after the 
transfer by the secretary of title to the property of 
the tribe, all federal supervision was to end and the 
laws of the several states shall apply to the tribe and 
its members in the same manner as they apply to other 
citizens or persons within their jurisdiction (Getches, 
et al., 1979 : 468; Getches, et al. , 1977 : 142, 151,
emphasis added. See esp : 143).
Termination was designed to get the American government 
"out of the Indian business". Termination revealed instead 
that the government still remains very much In the Indian
business. Termination can be traced back to a treaty with
the Chactaw in 1830. On that faateful day a "black hole" 
appeared that continues to bombard our society with its 
"neutrinos" today (Jones, 1982):
Whereas the General Assembly of the State of
Mississipi has extended the laws of said State to 
persons and property, within the chartered limits of the 
same, and the President of the United States has said 
that he cannot protect the Choctaw people from the 
operation of these laws; Now therefore that the Choctaw 
may live under their own laws in peace. . . [etc]
(Kappler, 1972: 310-11).
The Choctaw were removed to what is now Oklahoma. And 
live under their own laws they did - until 1898. In that 
year the Curtis Act dismantled the fully functioning 
constitutional democracies of the Five Civilized Tribes in 
Oklahoma.
The years between 1871 and 1934 were certainly the 
darkest hour for the American Indian. Then, in 1934, the 
Indian Reorganisation Act was passed, establishing a 
"democratic" tribal council system of government. We will
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not take the time here to go into the extent of coercion and 
manipulation involved in this event, but it should be 
remembered that to this day, traditional Indian people have 
never accepted the I.R.A.
A conservative backlash in government set in motion 
plans for Termination in 1946. The chief proponent for 
Termination was Dillon S. Myer, who headed the War
Relocation Authority in W.W. II, which was a system of
concentration camps for 140,000 Japanese Americans. All 
these camps, except for one, were on Indian Reservations. 
Dillon S. Myer then had these credentials on his resume when 
he became head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1950 
(Drinnon, 1987: 265).
Termination itself was an extensiive program of
relocation from the reservations to the cities. One half of 
all Indians were coaxed and bribed into the cities, where 
they could get their ‘'civil rights”, thereby obfuscating an 
important promise of the I.R.A.: reducing a question of
special l&gaJL to one of x&Cfi. Concurrently, the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 was able to modify the 
tribal-federal relationship as a source of Indian rights, so 
that instead of a land base, the Indians were now offered a 
Bill of Rights. The continuity with the past is perhaps best 
revealed by Vine Deloria (1969). Before the arrival of 
missionaries, Indians had land and the missionaries had the
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Bible. After their arrival, the Indians had the Bible and 
the missionaries had the land.
A person might wonder how it came about that the 
I.R.A., in 1934, led to Termination, in 1953. But the Curtis 
Act of 1898 reveals instead that the I.R.A. .ds.rl.v.e.s. from 
Termination, which it subsequently helped' shape with P.L 
280.
The ultimate significance of the Curtis Act is revealed 
to us by Felix S. Cohen (1971 : 428-30). An autonomous
Indian Territory in the Territory of Oklahoma impeded white 
settlement and political institutions from developing. The 
Curtis Act was a way of imposing the Bawes Allotment Act of 
1887 in such a way as to "dissolve the tribal masses",
thereby creating the political constituency for the I.R.A., 
by way of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. The process 
set in motion by the Curtis Act was completed in 1906. Thus 
was born the State of Oklahoma. Immediately, Oklahoma sent a 
delegation to Congress in order to repeal Federal laws
designed for the protection of the Indians in the State.
Termination is the "negative space", it mirrors
negatively, that which is demanded. Ultimately, reality
presents itself in a compelling way. Ironically enough, it
was in the context of urbanised discrimination created by
Termination that the American Indian Movement was born, in
1968, revealing how we experience repressed history in
mystified ways, down the road. A trend taken to its extreme
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generates its own opposite, proving that Termination reveals 
Sovereignity even as it suppresses it Philip Slater (1974) 
calls this process a .s..Q£l.al jsxsraifiii. Social reality .do..e..s. 
move in the direction of that which is demanded (Quinney, 
1980: 1)
The impossibility of ontology turns out to be a 
suppression of that which is demanded (Levy, 1981 : 68). In
terms of this thesis, then, the impossibility of praxis 
turns out to be a suppression of the American Indian. 
Frederick Turner (1980) has, regarding this problem, told us 
that the emergence of the bourgeois experience of history in 
mystified ways is grounded in the genocidal depopulation of 
Indians.
I have found Federal Indian Law a compelling subject, 
precisely for its wealth of evidence of distorted 
communication. And where was social science in the 1950’s? 
During the termination proceedings designed to sell out 
sovereignty to the ideology of self-determination, academic 
social science was silent (Getches, 1979 : 90).
The situation seems no better today. At this very 
moment, several thousand Navajo and Hopi Indians are facing 
up to a piece of legislation called Public Law 93-531 : the 
Navajo-Hopi Relocation Act, which passed Congress in 1974. 
Traditional Navajo and Hopi people are currently asking the 
American public to assist them in stopping this program of 
forced relocation. The United States government claims to
be resolving an historically rooted land dispute between the 
Navajo and Hopi nations, but in reality is clearing the 
Indian people from their homeland because of the 55 billion 
dollars worth of coal, oil, and uranium underneath the 
surface. Hopi prophecy has warned that desecration of this 
land will bring forth the end of the world. Hop! spiritual 
leaders through the centuries have prophecized a "gourd full 
of ashes" that would bring vast destruction to the earth. 
The mining of uranium from this land at Big Mountain in 
Arizona represents an inextricable link between genocide 
against American Indians and the escalating arms race. A 
form of life speaking to us, we will not listen. What 
methodological inhibition prevents us from simply listening, 
and hearing this? Indeed, there is no word for relocation in 
the Navajo language. To relocate means to disappear, never 
to be seen again.
It is not regret for the sunken Atlantides that 
animates us, but hope for a recreation of language. 
Beyond the desert of criticism, we wish to be called 
again (P. Ricoeur, quoted in Quinney, 1982).
Structurally, the struggle has taken on the phenomenal 
form of a dispute between the Navajo and Hopi tribal 
councils. The Hopi tribal council has lawyers from Salt 
Lake City making sure that their side will not be 
discriminated against in the distribution of foreseen 
royalties after leasing the land to Anaconda Mining and 
Kenicott Copper - both heavily owned by the Mormon church,
61
of which the Hopi’s lawyers are stock holding members. These 
lawyers first approached the Navajo Tribal Council with 
their offer of "assistance". They were rejected outright. 
Then, these same lawyers went to the Hopi Tribal Council and 
got themselves hired. Two of them, Boyden and Owens, were 
the same people who wrote the bill mandating the Arizona 
courts to "partition the [Joint Use Area] without prejudice" 
(Redhouse, 1981 : 28. Emphasis added).
Historically, we must recall what was said earlier 
about the Tribal Council system of government that was 
formally imposed upon Indian Nations in 1934. Significantly, 
the first tribal council to come into existence was the 
Navajo, in 1923, right after the discovery of the vast 
mineral deposits on their reservation. The land from which 
the Indians are to be removed under P.L. 93 - 5.31 is exactly 
the same land surveyed in 1923(Redhouse, 1981).
According to the General Accounting Office, the 
investigative arm of Congress, Public Law 93-531 cannot be 
repealed because the requirement for relocation is the 
result of a final court order and to prevent the required 
move, the Congress would have to defy the Courts. It is 
unclear whether the Courts will ever be willing to 
reconsider their mandate, 
unworkable (Proxmire, 1986).
One thing in particular stands out in these findings by 
the G.A.O.: the nature of the relationship between court
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order and congressional legislation. American Indians have 
historically always borne the brunt of the American 
Government’s inability to solve its own internal
organizational problems. The case of the Cherokee Nation vs
the state of Georgia in 1831 represents this point well 
regarding the relationship between the federal government 
and the states. The G.A.O. findings just summarized seem to 
raise this problem regarding the relationship between the 
legislative and judicial branches of government: the
requirement for relocation is the result of a final court 
order and to prevent the required move, the Congress would 
have to defy the Courts. The point I wish to make now is 
that if we cut through the distorted communication being 
brought to bear as the dominant interpretive scheme, we 
shall reveal a hang-up from way back. In addressing the
situation at Big Mountain, Hollis Whitson (1985 : 374) tells 
us :
Congressional policy makers seem to view their 
role as one responding to judicial determinations,
while the federal judges say that their role is to 
effectuate congressional policy.
Elsewhere in the same article, Whitson (1985:396-7) states:
Many policymakers on Capital Hill believe that the 
relocation policy is mandated by federal court 
decisions and cannot be disturbed by an act of 
Congress. This argument is only partially true. The 
federal courts have indicated that their affirmance of 
the relocation policy is based in large part on 
congressional intent.
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What we seem to have lie re is a situation in which a 
shared legislative and judicial concern to extend principles 
of justice to interested parties in a non-discriminatory way 
is undermined and unworkable in practice because it is 
precisely in Indian Law (and History) that are set the 
conditions from which these principles of justice are 
derived. Expectations that these principles can then be 
extended to Indian Law reverses this historical relation and 
thus prevents legislative and judicial branches from working 
together to solve the problem. A fundamental injustice lies 
at the historical origin of the situation at Big Mountain 
and continues to operate upon and through the subjects and 
actors. The principles and discursive terms we employ 
cannot be extended to this situation because in actual 
history those very principles have derived from it. 
Resolution of American principles of justice r_e_au.lr.es. 
priority focus on Indian Law :
Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the 
shift from fresh air to poison gas in our political 
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more 
than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the 
rise and fall in our democratic faith (Felix S. Cohen, 
1971).
Those interested in pursuing this line of study would 
do well to examine the approach taken by James P.Boggs (1984 
: 205-31):
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In this paper, I have examined a contemporary 
event, the sale of reservation resources to a large 
energy company. Many elements of this event exhibit 
historical parallels and analogues. The Northern 
Cheyenne-Arco deal opens a window on the past and 
brings history into greater relevance for studying 
contemporary policy issues.
The reality to which we attend is never only what it 
is, but also what it &&&. It is a system which has depth. 
How are we to attend to this "higher reality"? How has the 
sociological relationship involving Indians and Europeans 
given us this problem? The answer may be found in the 
categorical conception represented by the very term Indian 
itself. Why do we call them Indians? What hang-ups from 
way back does our analysis reveal?
In societies that are still in the process of 
establishing a sense of identity, the establishment of 
a normative, characteristic image of the group’s 
characteristics is a psychological necessity; and the 
simplest means of defining or expressing the sense of 
such norms is by rejecting some other group whose 
character is deemed to be the opposite (Slotkin, 1973 : 
68).
The category of Indian is a representation that 
justifies and rationalizes policies whose latent function is 
to avoid the historical ambivalence in the dualistic 
cultural climate of post-Medieval Europe. Europeans
projected various means of dealing with their basic problems 
through the adoption of varying stances toward the Indians 
(Slotkin, 1973 : 118). One such problem for the emerging
democratic society was confusion about the relation between 
equality of condition and equality of opportunity :
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Without a cheap land base and access to them, the 
paradox or even conflict of these two sides of American 
political and economic liberalism would have become 
apparent (Berkhofer, 1978 : 137-8).
The situation in Indian Affairs has not changed since 
the infamous day when President Andrew Jackson sent the 
Cherokee on the Trail of Tears "Justice Marshall has 
rendered his decision. Now let him enforce it." To this day, 
Indian policy continues to be an exercise in oscillation, 
whether between federal and state levels, the houses of 
Congress, Congress and the Courts, or within the BIA itself. 
Indians are suffering because their "development" requires 
precisely those things that white society requires them to 
be deprived of : land, capital, and education (Shkilnyk,
1985 : 240-1).
Instead of the policies that are demanded, and which 
would have to be grounded in social change of the most 
funndamental sort, legislated at the highest levels of 
Constitutional Law, the category of Indian remains out of 
touch with the status of American Indians. The main effects 
of the category are to rationalise and justify bourgeois 
policies precisely in order to treat Indians as pawns in a 
game of high stakes that is supposedly being played for 
their benefit (Slikilnyk, 1985: 216-230; see also Berkhofer,
1978).
The price our society pays for subjugating those whose 
democratic principles inform this very society is
66
estrangement from the Constitution at the statutory, 
regulatory level. Many legal phenomena occur in everyday 
life that violate the U.S. Constitution. Jammed courts are a 
manifestation of this phenomenon. The U.S. government is 
still breaking Indian treaties, when they are in fact the 
highest possible type of political document. Our society 
seems especially to need a renewal in legal and social 
theory. In the words of Richard Quinney (1982: 91), "The
unity of the sacred and the secular is the paradigmatic 
solution for the crisis of social existence."
The enlightened world of the Renaissance tended to look 
at the New World through Medieval spectacles (Steiner, 1976 
•' 144). Europeans were always of two minds toward Indians. 
The Puritan understanding of Indians represented their 
understanding of themselves (1976 ; 239). Medieval ties of
association were gone. Ambiguities that were now free- 
floating elements had to be redefined if chaos was to be 
avoided. What the Puritans desired above all was "a tabula 
rasa on which they could inscribe their dream" (Slotkin, 
1973 : 38). The most significant aspect of this was the
substitution of racial-cultural distinctions for the 
traditional English divisions of class and religion 
(Slotkin, 1973 : 68). In practice, two opposed images of
the Indian developed from the ambivalence of the colonists 
(Slotkin, 1973 : 153). When the Indian was good, he was a
"noble savage". When he was bad, he was demonic. The
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category itself served to generalize a conception to all 
Indians, conceive Indians in terms of their deficiencies 
according to White ideals, and most importantly, use moral 
evaluation as description of Indians (Berkhofer,1978:25-6):
The cultural climate of the late Middle Ages was 
organized in terms of basic contradictions and 
polarities ... [T]he moral world assumed a duality at a 
quasi-objective level, in the sense that both virtues 
and vices were projected on to an external world. 
(Barbu, 1960 : 64).
Puritanism was both an extreme reaction to a state of 
disorientation and an attempt to establish a new balance 
between sacred and secular values :
The basic elements which were closely integrated 
in the structure of western medieval culture had, 
during this [modern] period, fallen apart...
While polarity connoted opposite forces within a 
basically integrated whole, involves the
idea of oscillation between extremes, and even that of 
a split (Barbu, I960: 142-159).
Democracy was not a product of Medieval culture 
(Awkesasne, 1978) :
The first step in achieving a new social order is, 
apparently, to construct a new nature that will 
justify, and even demand, its implementation (Evernden, 
1985 : 19).
Perhaps there is no better representation of our 
historical estrangement than the American Progress mural, 
reproduced in Figure 4. The mural is a representation of
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hierarchic society to itself. The mural is not a collection
of images, but a social relation mediated by images.
According to Guy Debord (1983) :
it is obviously because history has not yet been 
liberated that the forces of historical absence begin 
to compose their own exclusive landscape.
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The ideological function of Euro-American spatial 
representation has been to :
substitute the credible prospect of an infinite 
reservoir of land and economic resources as an 
alternative to the intense conflict of social classes, 
economic interest groups, or regional groupings of 
slave and free states. But in the real-world pursuit 
of expansion, American political leaders discovered 
that each new advance of the territory of Freedom 
served to provide new occasions for the acting out of 
inescapable conflicts(Slotkin,1985: 211).
In regard to Figure 4, consider that the bourgeois 
perceptual world is organized into means and ends. Any act 
of perception occurs in a surrounding social space (Mead, 
1982 : 31). The space being filled by Europeans seems
somehow qualitatively proportionate to the historical 
aspects of reality being excluded by the narrow tunnel 
vision of the bourgeois world view. Concealed domination is 
on record as cultural ambivalence:
The adequate record of even the confusions of our 
forbears may help,not only to clarify these confusions, 
but to engender a salutory doubt whether we are wholly 
immune from different but equally great confusions 
(Pearce, 1965 : xii).
The reality to which we attend is never only what it 
is, but also what it was. It is a system which has depth 
(see Figure 5):
The present forms in which our myths appear embody 
not only the solutions to past problems and conflicts; 
they contain the questions as well, and they reflect 
the conflicts of thought and feeling and actions that 
were the mythmakers original concern...
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It is this myth whose fictive fatalities lurk in 
the cultural environment we inhabit, whose significance 
can still be seen behind the silhouettes of 
skyscrapers, casinos, pipelines, gantries, and freeways 
(Slotkin, 1985: 12-20)...
Behind the mystique of the Indian wars lay a 
concept of social relations that insisted on the racial 
basis of class differences, and insisted that in a 
society so divided, strife was unavoidable until the 
more savage race was wholly exterminated or subjugated 
(Slotkin, 1985, 531).
Indian survivors of the Pequot massacre in 1637 were 
taken to the Caribbean as slaves (Goodman, 1981 : 237).
American Indian history reveals not how domination leads to 
annihilation, but rather, how domination derives from 
annihilation :
A few more moons. A few more winters - and not 
one of the descendants of the mighty hosts that once 
moved over this broad land or lived in happy homes, 
protected by the Great Spirit, will remain to mourn 
over the graves of a people--once more powerful and 
hopeful than yours. But why should I mourn at the 
untimely fate of my people? Tribe follows tribe, and 
nation follows nation like the waves of the sea. It is 
the order of nature, and regret is useless. Your time 
of decay may be distant, but it will surely come, for 
even the White Man whose God walked and talked with him 
as friend with friend, cannot be exempt from the common 
destiny. We may be brothers after all. We will see...
And when the last Red Man shall have perished, and 
the memory of my tribe shall have become a myth among 
the White Men, these shores will swarm with the 
invisible dead of my tribe, and when your children's 
children think themselves alone in the field, the 
store, the shop, upon the highway or in the silence of 
the pathless woods, they will not be alone...
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At night when the streets of your cities and 
villages are silent and you think them deserted, they 
will throng with the returning hosts that once filled 
them and still love this beautiful land. The White Man 
will never be alone...
Let him be just and deal kindly with my people, 
for the dead are not powerless. Dead, did I say? 
There is no death, only a change of worlds (Sealth, 
1854).
M  ^ v
Source : (Quinney, 1982)
We cannot expect the world to cohere horizontally if it 
is not joined together vertically as well (Schell, 1982 
: 177)
The reality to which we attend is never only what it 
is, but also what it was. It is a system with depth. 
(Barbu, 1960).
Society "comes down" to us historically, as general as 
the falling rain, but not nearly so uniform in the 
distribution of its effects. These must be 
* represented* (Author’s meditation on Emile Durkheim).
It’s Snowing History (From R.H. Brown. 1985).
CHAPTER IV 
M M X M X M
Reality is expanded when dualism is abolished. There is 
an evolutionary ontology in performing interpretive tasks 
(Sennett, 1980). Praxis is no mere matter of taking theory 
in one hand, methods in the other, and fitting them 
together. These logical puzzles are mystified substitutes 
for the social ontology they exclude, due to their 
epistemological properties. This social ontology, I 
maintain, is found in the materials of history. In this 
paper I have presented findings that lend support to the 
idea that repression of areas of conciousness (involved in 
the adjustment people make to living with "The Bomb”) is 
grounded in a social relation of repression which then, in 
turn, represses that relation from awareness too. American 
Indian History demands to be revealed precisely because it 
is so concealed. Accordingly, we have had to deconstruct the 
dominant conception of the sociology of knowledge as a 
logical puzzle, and thereby give it an historical rendering 
which enables us to assert that the suppression of Praxis is 
grounded in the suppression of the American Indian.
Social reality is even more complex than the pseudo­
complexities thrown up at us by logical puzzles The
74
75
heirship eases comprising* the land claims on the White Earth 
Reservation in Minnesota comprise probably one of the most 
complex phenomena you can imagine. A sociologist who, in the 
course of studying this, chooses to toy around with a 
logical puzzle is making a serious mistake. Say that he or 
she chooses to study it in terms of the observer versus 
observed "dialectic”. Since this "dialectic" has merely 
replaced the master-slave dialectic in Social Science 
(Hearn, 1985: 196), you see we are dealing with a form of
concealed domination. How ironic that we, as s.„o..Q.i.o..lQgl.st.s, 
take for granted an entire curriculum organised into 
integrating theory and methods, for example. Are we up to 
the challenge of social reality? Only the interests of our 
masters are served if we do not seek to make the 
complexities of consciousness standards for collective 
experience (Sermett, 1980). Concerning American Indian 
History, our first task is to abolish the disjunction 
between the category of "Indian" and the actual status of 
American Indians. At present, the disjunction prevents us 
from understanding the nature of their sovereignty and 
treaty rights, and the relationship of these to our society. 
If domination is the "trouble", my message is that 
sovereignty is the "issue".
Of domination, three conclusive things may be said. Our 
ability to detect such realms is conditioned by those very 
realms. Merleau-Ponty has said that there is an informing of
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perception by culture which enables us to say that culture 
is perceived (Ihde, 1986:52). Domination, however, is 
invisible. This is why we must resort to a theory of 
distorted communication. The ultimate grounding of our being 
in social existence is not through vision. It is through 
language (Quinney, 1982).
The second thing we can say about domination is that it 
is as close or as far away as your next experience. If 
increased material benefits serve to compensate the masses 
for loss of liberty, likewise objectivity and detachment 
compensate social scientists (as we are called in this age) 
for moral ambiguity(Gouldner, 1976). Our understanding of
this is given to us through the notion of the paradigm.
Thirdly, domination mirrors negatively true social 
being. It is the ultimate distortion of social existence, 
yet itself is a form of social existence.
A post-modern sensibility must come to inform our 
efforts as social scientists if we are to free ourselves 
from our massive continuity with the European Middle Ages. 
Our modern confusions are essentially medieval, giving 
modern society its historical aura, its social properties. 
In this realization is to be found a heightened awareness.
The form of this continuity with the past maintains a 
dualism which prevents us from relating to it. This is what 
makes it a hang-up from way back. Yet, there is a distinctly 
modern twist to our condition. Somewhere back in our
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history, ambivalence, oscillation, and dualistic splits in
consciousness became reorganised into the modern structure 
of consciousness we in sociology understand by the notion of 
the paradigm. Zevedei Barbu’s assessment of Rationalism is 
that it is essentially a product of visual perception.
In modern times, perceptual experiences tend to be 
separate and distinct, with visual stimuli and 
experience prevailing above all others (Tuan, 
1982:115).
The emphasis on relating clear sight with clear
thinking has been a cornerstone of Western Rationalism.
Barbu summarizes nicely:
The gradual decline of religious beliefs and 
superstitions, and the rise of secular rationalism 
following the close of the sixteenth century was .... 
associated with the reorganisation of the human 
perceptual field (Barbu, 1960:26).
My point is that medieval ambivalence, itself a product 
of visual thinking, has been reorganized in such a way as to 
preserve visual perceptual dominance. Paradigms are figure- 
ground structures of perception. The distinction between
figure and ground is the most elementary act of visual 
perception. Our modern condition has been described by 
Gunnar Mydral (1944:xlix):
People will attempt to conceal the conflict 
between their different valuations of what is 
desireable and undesireable, right or wrong, by keeping 
away some valuations from awareness and by focusing 
attention on others...For the same opportune purpose, 
people will twist and mutilate their beliefs of how 
social reality actually is...But people also want to be 
rational.
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Boundaries between ingroups and outgroups make use of 
perceptual distortions. Wilder (1981:214), whose research 
was summarised in Chapter Two, also tells us that 
“boundaries are created through cognitive organization of 
persons in an analogous manner to that used in the 
organization of physical objects".
According to Alvin Gouldner (1975:429), "objects 
constitute stable differentia in regions, thus constituting 
the terms in which regions are defined. One "sees" the 
objects rather than the enregioning space". In this world 
view of objects, the means of rationality become ends in 
themselves (Kosik, 1976:53-8). Instead of being grounded in 
social reality, modern rationality grounds out in a world 
view of objects.
Domination is Invisible. It is allowed to appear only 
to the extent that it is not visible (Debord, 1983:7). It is 
a structure and a process that appears as a logical puzzle 
of structure and process. The reality it excludes from its 
cognitive schemata continues to exist fully through it. Its 
one-dimensionality is belied by its self-defeating nature. 
It can succeed only by destroying everything.
Domination appears hierarchically. We have the ability 
to select visibly appearing phenomena in order to represent 
the invisible world. According to David Bloor ( 1984:66-7), 
"it is perfectly possible for systems of thought to reflect 
society and be addressed to the natural world at the same
79
time”. In this sense, Hierarchy is a
representation. Our only other option, it seems to me, is to 
revert to a hang-up from way back: are hierarchies "real" or 
not. Wallace (1983) seems to take this approach in his 
recent text.
Nowadays we are conditioned to think with our eyes. The 
senses with which we perceive the social world are social 
products too (Kosik, 1976). Dualism involves a mode of 
information processing found in visual perception. Each side 
of a dualistic split is like an ingroup and an outgroup. 
Each side of the split is contained in a feedback loop
schemata; a circular precept-percept perceptual circuit. 
Precepts selectively perceive stimuli which feed back upon, 
and reinforce, the precepts.
In their German. Ideology (Easton and Guddatt, 1967), 
Marx and Engels’ very point of departure in critiquing
Feuerbach is for his error in confusing visual perception 
for awareness. This prevented him from attaining an 
historical perspective. If some of you haven’t noticed this, 
remember what Paul Ricoeur has to say: one principle for
interpreting texts is that you don’t get their meaning
unless you already live under the aura of what you are 
after.
Ideologies are like paradigms in the work of Alvin 
Gouldner. In The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology 
(1976:195), Chapter 9 begins with the French Revolution:
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Like the eyes with which we watch events around 
us, it was the events watched, not the eyes watching 
them, that were centered in attention.
The term "ideology" was coined by Detracy in 1790, in a 
treatise whose first part attends to the relationship 
between visual perception and our ideas and conceptions of 
social reality. For the eye to see, it must select some data 
and repress other data. Ideologies treat social and 
historical reality in much the same way. The reality that 
hides itself behind this presence is also manifest through 
it. The background is also always present with the 
foreground. (Barrett, 1978:166-7).
Our task is to free analysis from the redundancy of the 
socially conditioned narrowness of perspective. We thereby 
seek to incorporate social reality in a meaningful and 
ontological sense. We are finally compelled to take an 
historical approach. Historical reality can simply and 
effectively be grasped in the following metaphor.
Take one large cardboard box and label it 
"Annihilation". Take a slightly smaller box and call it 
"Domination", and place it inside the first box. Now take a 
next size smaller box and call it "Exploitation". Place it 
inside the box marked "Domination". Take a next size smaller 
box and call it "Discrimination". Place it inside the box 
called "Exploitation". Finally, take a next size smaller box 
and place it inside the box marked "Discrimination". This 
last box is called "Manipulation".
81
This relationship between Annihilation, Domination, 
Exploitation, Discrimination, and Manipulation captures 
historical reality. It is a set of nested concepts of 
subsequent modes of association relating to previous ones as 
the higher order conceptions from which they have derived. 
And far from the criticism that this conceptualization is an 
infinite regress, it is a Totality. This nested set of 
higher order conceptions is the reality that hierarchy 
substitutes for in Chapter Two above. It is the basis for my 
proposition that nuclear war and American Indian History 
both reveal how Domination leads to Annihilation , but
rather, how Domination derives from Annihilation.
I.A. Newby (1965:189), himself a student of Gurmar 
Myrdal, discloses this relationship well in reference to 
Blacks :
Finally, Congressman James M. Griggs of Georgia 
broached the ultimate solution. Noting an increased 
amount of racial agitation among Negroes, he warned in 
1908 that "the utter extermination of a race of people 
is inexpressibly sad, yet if its existence endangers 
the welfare of mankind, it is fitting that it should be 
swept away".
At the turn of this century, an official census 
recorded the population of American Indians in the United 
States at 250,000. Ten thousand gave their lives in W.W. I. 
Following the war, a flu epidemic swept through Indian 
country and nearly one out of four perished. Thanks to a 
phenomenal growth rate in the 1960’s, their population today
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is approximately 1.5 million. Prior to European contact, 
there were at least 12-14 million of them (Dobryns, 1982).
One central reality (Shkylnik, 1985:240) our
society’s relationship to its indigenous people is its 
central reality. "To regain the center of life is the 
objective in the reconstruction of a metaphysic in our time" 
(Quinney, 1982 87). The gunships patrolling and
surveilling the Big Mountain region reveal that forced 
relocation is lntjfen.ti.o_n.al. The New Lands selected for the 
relocatees are radioactively contaminated by a corporate 
discharge into the region’s main river by United Nuclear in 
1979. One of our ultimate fears is groundwater pollution. 
American Indian History reveals that our very relation to 
our environment is grounded in the relationship to the 
American Indian (see Shkylnik, 1985).
The fundamental inability of government to deal 
holistieally with a shattered society has remained as 
constant as the Indians’ powerlessness to effect social 
justice (Shkylnik, 1985:206).
There is a sense among a number of Indian leaders 
in Canada that such conditions could not possibly be 
tolerated in the society in the absence of an implicit 
acceptance of Indian genocide. Certainly such a
speculation is understandable in view of the wide gulf 
separating the stated objective of government policy, 
"to lead the Indian people toward the full, free, and
non-discriminatorv participation in Canadian society",
from the apparently negative results of policy. But the 
assumption of deliberate malice on the part of 
bureaucrats who implement policy does not fit the 
history of the Grassy Narrows relocation, for example. 
Yet in this case we can observe clearly the workings of 
an xnpXa.caM.fe XosXc that produced an outcome
contradictory to the intent (Shkylnik, 1985:235.
Emphasis added).
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The sociology of knowledge should begin looking at this 
central reality. That which has been most repressed turns 
out to be of final consequence. By de-.ciins.t.mc_tLing the 
dominant conception of Indians as a social category, the 
path is open to incorporating a more adequate and 
historically informed understanding of American Indians. 
This type of interpretive task gives us the evolutionary 
ontology that Richard Quinney calls the Depth of Reality. 
Without this development, we remain victims of Domination. 
The words of Richard Sennett (1980) ring true, that only the 
interests of our masters are served if we do not seek to 
make the complexities of consciousness standards for
collective experience.
There has always been an "American Indian Movement". 
The "spectacle" (Debord, 1983) that was Wounded Knee in 1973 
revealed that the category of Indian in effect is so
distorting that Indians themselves are distorted into a 
phenomenal form. But they are also a reality. Our category’s 
final effect seems to have ontologically split the Indian 
people themselves (Berkhofer, 1978). But the source of this 
effect is within our experience, not theirs. Winona LaDuke 
tells a story about the White woman who heard about the 
problems Indians are having and decided she wanted to help 
them. One day she saw an Indian woman on the street and
walked up to her. She told the Indian woman about her
concern and asked if there was something she could do to
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help. (Maybe we could hold a raffle or something, eh?). The 
Indian woman said, "There is something you can do to help 
me. You are standing on my foot."
The methodology of the history of bourgeois perception 
promises a "coming home" to the sociologist of knowledge 
(Lowe, 1982). As a sensitising motif, let us from now on 
endeavor to keep mindful watch on "the continuing Indian 
Wars" (see Johansen and Maesta, 1979) as the appropriate 
notion for our interpretive task.
Emanations are flowinng through our society now that 
bear this thesis out: White Earth Reservation in Minnesota; 
Big Mountain; The Black Hills; Northeastern Wisconsin; the 
Upper Peninsula of Michigan; these are all designated as 
"National Sacrifice Areas", in order to supply energy to 
growing cities. And 80% of the usable uranium in this 
country is on Indian land. We must be alert to signs and 
portents; events and sayings in the human and natural worlds 
that others might regard as trivial, but which the Gods have 
entrusted with momentary meaning, pertinence, and power 
(Quinney, 1982). One such omen is the recent appearance of 
the post-modern novel Wllite NfiLiafi (DeLillo, 1986). Another 
is the representation of the recent space shuttle disaster 
in the (1981) film K_Qy.an,.ls.au.a.t..s.i, a film based on Hopi 
prophecy.
The symbolic import of this analysis was revealed long 
ago, from the center of the world, in the Black Hills:
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Then when he had been still a little while to hear 
the birds sing, he spoke again: "Behold the earth!" So
I looked down and saw it lying yonder like a hoop of 
peoples, and in the center bloomed the holy stick that 
was a tree, and where it stood there crossed two roads, 
a red one and a black. "From where the giant lives (the 
north) to where you always face (the south) the red 
road goes, the road of good, " the Grandfather said, 
"and on it shall your nation walk. The black road goes 
from where the thunder beings live (the west) to where 
the sun continually shines (the east), a fearful road, 
a road of troubles and of war. On this also you shall 
walk, and from it you shall have the power to destroy a 
people’s foes. In four ascents you shall walk the earth 
with power."
I think he meant that I should see four 
generations, counting me, and now I am seeing the 
third. (Black Elk, in Neihardt, 1961:29).
86
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Akwesasne. 1978. A Basic Call to Consciousness. Rooseve11own, 
N.Y. Akwesasne Notes.
A1exander, Jeffrey. 1982. Theoretical Logic in Sociology.
Vol. 1, Positivism  Presuppositions and Current
Controversies. Berkeley :University of California Press.
Aronson, Ronald. 1983. The Dialectics of Disaster. London : 
Verso.
Barbu, Zevedei. 1960. Problems of Historical Psychology.
New York : Grove Press.
_.--------- . 1971. Society. Culture, and Personality .
Oxford : Blackwell.
Barrett, William. 1979. The Illusion of Technique. Garden City,: 
N.Y. : Anchor Press.
Bateson, Gregory. 1979. Mind and Nature : A Necessary Unity.
New York : Dutton.
Berkhofer, Robert. 1978. The White Man’s Indian. New York :
Knopf.
Berman, Morris. 1984. The Re-Enchantment of the World.
New York : Bantam.
B1oor, David. 1984. "Durkheim and Mauss." Society and Knowledge. 
N.Stehr and V.Meja, eds. New Brunswick : Transaction Books.
Boggs, James P. 1984."The Challenge of Reservation Resource
Deve1opment." Native Americans and Energy Development II. 
Joseph Jorgensen, ed. Boston : Anthropology Resource 
Center.
Brown, Richard Harvey. 1985. "Historical Science as Linguistic 
Figuration." Theory and Society. Sept : 677-703.
Burnette, Robert, and John Koster. 1975. The Road to Wounded 
Knee. New York : Bantam.
Burtt, E.A. 1954. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science. Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday.
87
Butcher, Peter. 1986. "The Phenomenological Psychology of
J. Krishnamurti." Journal, of Transpersonal Psychology 
18:1:35-50.
Cohen, Felix S. 1971. Handbook of Federal Indian Law.
Albuquerque : University of New Mexico Press.
Coward, Rosalind, and John Ellis. 1977.Language and Materialism. 
London : Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Debord, Guy. 1983. Society of the Spectacle. Detroit : Black and
Red.
DeLillo, Don. 1986. White Noise. New York : Penguin.
Deloria, Vine. 1969. Custer Died For Your Sins.
New York : Macmillan.
------------   1974. Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties .
New York : Delacorte.
Dobryns, H.F. 1982. Native American Historical Demography. 
Bloomington : Indiana University Press.
Drinnon, Richard. 1987. Keeper of Concentration Camps.
Berkeley : University of California Press.
Durkheim, Emi1e . 1953. Sociology and Philosophy.
New York : Free Press.
 ------- _ 1982. The Rules of Sociological Method .
S. Lukes, ed. London : Macmillan.
------------   1983. Pragmatism and Sociology. New York :
Cambridge University Press.
Easton, L.D., and K.Guddat. 1967. Writings of the Young Marx on
Philosophy and Society. Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday.
Evernden, Neil. 1985. "Constructing the Natural". North American
Review. March : 15 - 19.
Frankfurt Institute. 1972. Aspects of Sociology. Boston :
Beacon.
Fuhrman, Ellsworth. 1984. "Alvin Gouldner and the Sociology of 
Knowledge." The Sociological Quarterly 25:3:287-300.
Garrison, James. 1986. "Husserl, Galileo, and the Processes of 
Idealization." .Syiithe.se. 66:2:329-37.
88
Getches, David H., D.M. Rosenfelt, and C.F. Wilkinson. 1977. 
Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law. St.Paul :
West Pub.Co.
-----------  1979. Federal Indian Law : Cases and Materials.
St.Paul : West.
Goodman, Jeffrey. 1981. American Genesis. New York : Summit.
Gouldner, Alvin. 1975. "Sociology and the Everyday Life." The 
Idea of Social Structure. Lewis Coser, ed. New York : 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
---------- . 1976.' The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology .
New York : Seabury.
Habermas, J. 1975. Legitimation Crisis. Boston : Beacon.
Hearn, Frank. 1985. Reason and Freedom in Sociological Thought .
Boston : Allen and Unwin.
Holbrook, Bruce. 1981. The Stone Monkey. New York : Morrow.
Ihde, Don. 1986. Consequences of Phenomenology. Stony Brook 
State University of New York Press.
Iowa City Press Citizen. 1985. "Parents Confront Board Over
Racism." March 13:1A.
Jay, Martin. 1984. : "Hierarchy and the Humanities."
Telos. 62 : 131-44.
Johansen, Bruce and Robert Maestas. 1979. Wasi’chu : The
Continuing Indian Wars. New York : Monthly Review Press.
Jones, Roger. 1982. Physics As Metaphor. Minneapolis : 
University of Minnesota Press.
Jung, C.G. 1964. "Mind and Earth." Collected Works. Vol. 10, 
Civilization in Transition. New York : Bollington 
Foundation.
Kappler, C.J. 1972. Indian Treaties. New York : Interland.
KeHer, T.W. 1968. Political Knowledge and Political Man. 
Dissertation. University of Iowa.
Kosik, Karel. 1976. Dialectics of the Concrete.
Boston : D. Reidel.
89
Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. "Fascism and Ideology." Chapter III of 
Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. E . Laclau.
London .* NLB.
Levy, Davi d . 1981. Realism  : An Essay on Interpretation and
Social. Reality. At 1 antic Highlands , N.J. :
Humanities Press.
Lowe, Donald M. 1982. History of Bourgeois Perception. Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press.
Mannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. New York :
Harcourt, Brace, and Co.
----------- • 1982. Structures of Thinking. Translated by
Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry Weber Nicholsen.
London : Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Maslow, A.H. 1976. Religion s , Values, and Peak Experiences. 
Columbus : Ohio State University Press.
McArthur, L.Z. 1982. "Cognitive Analysis of Relationship Between 
Physical Appearance and Stereotyping." Cognitive Social 
Psychology. A.H. Hastorf and A.M. Isen, eds.
New York : Elsevier.
Marx, Karl. 1971. The Grundrisse. D. Me Leilan, ed. New York : 
Harper and Row.
Mead, George Herbert. 1982. .The Individual and the Social .Self.
D.L.Miller, ed. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
Mills, C.W. 1959. The Sociological Imagination.
New York : Oxford.
Myr.dal, Gunnar. 1944. American Dilemma. New York :
Harper and Row.
Neihardt, John G. 1961. Black Elk Speaks. Lincoln : University 
of Nebraska Press.
Newby, I.A. 1965. Jim Crow’s Defense. Baton Rouge : Louisiana
State University Press.
O ’Neill, John. 1974. Making Sense Together . New York :
Harper and Row.
Pearce, Roy Harvey. 1965. The Savages of America. Baltimore :
Johns Hopkins Press.
90
Perrow, Charles. 1979. Complex Organizations. New York : 
Scott-Foresman.
Phillips, Bernard S. 1972. Worlds of the Future. Columbus,
Ohio : Merrill.
Pirsig, Robert. 1974. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. 
New York : Morrow.
Proxmire, William. 1986. Letter to G.S. Thomas. May 16.
Quinney, Richard. 1980. Providence . New York : Longman.
---------- • 1982. Social Existence. Beverly Hills : Sage.
Redhouse, John. 1981. "The Geopolitics of the Navajo-Hopi Land 
Dispute." Rooseveltown, N.Y. : Akwesasne Notes.
Schell, Jonathan. 1982. The Fate of the Earth. New York •' Avon.
 ---------  1984. The Abolition. New York : Knopf.
Schwartz, Barry. 1981. Vertical Classification : A Study in
Structuralism and the Sociology of Knowledge. Chicago 
University of Chicago Press.
Sealth. 1854. "Your Dead Cease to Love you." Sacramento : Arden 
Park.
Sennett, Richard. 1980. Authority. New York : Knopf.
Shkylnik, A.M. 1985. A Poison Stronger Than Love.
New Haven : Yale University Press.
Slater, Philip. 1974. Earthwalk. New York : Anchor.
-------  1977. The Wayward Gate . New York :
Harper and Row.
S1otkin, Richard. 1973. Regeneration Through Violence. 
Middletown, Conn. Wesleyan University Press.
-----------   1985. The Fatal Environment. New York : Antheum.
Stanley, Manfred. 1968. "Nature, Culture, and Scarcity."
American Sociological Review. (Dec. : 855 - 870).
Steiner, Stan. 1976. The Vanishing White Man. New York :
Harper and Row.
Tajfel, H., et al. 1971. "Social Categorization and Intergroup 
Behavior." European Journal of Social Psychology. 1:149-79.
91
Tajfel, H. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press.
Tuan, Yi Fu. 1982. Segmented Worlds and Self. Minneapolis :
University of Minnesota Press.
Turner, Frederick. 1980. Beyond Geography. New York : Viking.
Veblen, Thorstein. 1967. Absentee___Ownership. New York :
A. M. Kelley.
Wexler, Phillip. 1983. Critical Social Psychology. Boston : 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Wilder, D. 1981. "Perceiving Persons As A Group."
Cognitive Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup
Behavior . D .L . Hami1ton, ed. Hi11sdale, N.J. :
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Wallace, Walter. 1983. Principles of Scientific Sociology. 
Hawthorne, N.Y. -* Aldine Pub. Co.
Whitson, Hollis. 1985. "A Policy Review of the Federal
Government’s Relocation of Navajo Indians Under P.L. 
93-531 and P.L. 96-305." Arizona Law Review. 27:2:371-414.
Wuthnow, Robert, et al. 1984. Cultural Analysis. London : 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
92
VITA
Gordon Garnjobst has a B.A. from Buena Vista College in Storm 
Lake, Iowa. He enrolled at the College of William and Mary in 
1981. His current research interests are Federal Indian Law and 
the history of bourgeois visual perception. His future plans are 
to continue working in the area of social foundations of public 
policy. He currently lives in Iowa City.
